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ABSTRACT
This article uses the rich history of British common law, Parlia-
mentary action, and colonial prosecutions to explore how the Foun-
ders would have answered this question: Can a sitting president can be
prosecuted for crimes in courts of law or must he be first removed
from office?  In so doing, it takes a slightly different approach to im-
peachment than other scholars have taken.  It proposes that the Foun-
ders would have considered this matter as raising a jurisdictional
question involving the power of courts of law, on the one hand, and
the power of Congress, acting as the national grand jury and as a court
of impeachment, on the other.  They also would not have provided us
with a firm “yes” or “no” answer.  Instead, they would have begun by
stating that they gave the power of removal of a sitting President
solely to Congress and that the power to modify his powers rests with
the People, writ large.  And so, they would have asked whether the
proposed prosecution risks removal of a President from office, either
in fact (e.g., by incarceration) or de facto (e.g., by substantially inter-
fering with or modifying his exercise of his Constitutional duties or the
discretion given to him under that document).  I propose that the
Founders would say that in any case in which a potential result of
prosecutorial action is incarceration or restraint in the freedom to ex-
ercise presidential duties that do not merely ministerial supervision,
courts of law cannot enforce the prosecution until he is removed from
office by impeachment or otherwise.  But that leaves a few cases in
which the invasion may not be as severe.
I use history to defend the characterization of this impeachment
question as jurisdictional.  The Founders would have known that
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courts of common law and Parliament shared jurisdiction over prose-
cuting crimes.  They knew that the grand juries of the American colo-
nies also theoretically had the power to prosecute royally-appointed
chief-executives.  But they also knew that colonial grand jury power
was an empty right, because royal authorities regularly thwarted it.
They also would have known that the colonies lacked the power to
impeach (and thus, to remove) royally-appointed colonial leaders.
Moreover, the Founders certainly knew that, after the Declaration of
Independence, several state constitutions allowed the prosecution of a
sitting Chief Magistrate and either gave prosecutorial authority to leg-
islatures or split jurisdiction over crimes by high officials between leg-
islatures and courts of law.  Thus, they would have been familiar with
the theoretical possibility of prosecuting a President and would cer-
tainly have assumed it possible.  However, given the impracticability
of such a prosecution, they would have deemed impeachment a partic-
ularly important right to secure in their written Constitution.  The
Founders understood impeachment as a criminal proceeding.  A long
history of denials of due process raised their concerns about fairness
in that context.  They also understood that impeachment had political
implications.  They knew it had been used for political retribution in
England.  These problems vexed their consideration of impeachment.
Their solution was jurisdictional.  They split responsibility for en-
forcing compliance and assessing the punishment for an errant Presi-
dent.  Under their scheme, Congress has the power to investigate and
remove if necessary.  On the other hand, courts of law have jurisdic-
tion to enforce prosecutorial actions that do not pose a risk of removal
and also, prosecutions after Congress has removed a convicted person
from office.  And in order to avoid double jeopardy, they also pro-
vided that the Senate acting as the High Court of Impeachment, could
only deliver punishments that did not involve risks to life and limb.
The Founders would tell us that, under the model they crafted,
prosecutors with statutory authority still can investigate crimes alleged
to have been committed by a sitting president.  Indeed, they must, in
order to determine the nature and extent of alleged presidential in-
volvement.  However, they lack the ability to compel presidential co-
operation if a President is unwilling.  They cannot jail a President for
contempt.  Such actions would effect a removal, a responsibility that,
the Founders intended to place solely within the province of Congress.
Moreover, they would say that the President can fire prosecutors
without violating statutory rules for obstruction of justice.  Even if the
334 [VOL. 62:331
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President uses constitutionally-delegated powers with the sole motive
of foiling a prosecution, the response is impeachment proceedings to
deprive him of these powers and to protect the nation’s interest in the
presidency.  The Founders would also say that a prosecutor has a duty
to exercise prosecutorial discretion in deciding whether to proceed
against a sitting President through a court of law.
The Founders would have noted that, because courts of impeach-
ment have superior jurisdiction over matters within their concern, ar-
ticles of impeachment issued by the House of Representatives are an
assertion of jurisdiction over the case.  Properly issued, they will auto-
matically stay any other pending federal criminal proceeding regard-
ing the same person and conduct, including the work of a federal
grand jury.
The Founders would tell us that if a President is convicted by a
court of impeachment, he cannot be subsequently prosecuted for ob-
struction of justice with respect to acts that were, at the time they
were undertaken, delegated to him under the Constitution, even if
that behavior technically meets the language of a criminal obstruction
of justice statute.  The penalty for the misuse of an otherwise legiti-
mate power in order to prevent a prosecution, is removal from office.
However, the President can be prosecuted for the underlying crime,
the investigation of which he was attempting to obstruct.  And his ob-
struction could be the basis of conspiracy charges, if done intention-
ally to faciliate the misconduct of others.
Finally, the Founders would tell us that, because federal courts
have concurrent jurisdiction with Congress over the potential subjects
of impeachment, a federal court has the power to consider peripheral
questions regarding enforcement of prosecutorial action.  It has the
power to stay or delay a prosecution in a court of law for good cause
shown.  (It could not delay a constitutionally-conducted impeach-
ment.)  This article does not delve into what “good cause,” might
mean, but without doubt such a case would be presented by a reasona-
ble threat that the prosecution would interfere with Presidential duties
so as to constitute a constructive partial or full removal.  A federal
court also has the power to condition a request for the delay of a pro-
ceeding upon the waiver of any affirmative defenses that would other-
wise bar a later prosecution and to take action that is not compulsive
of the President to preserve documentary evidence.  However, if a
President still refuses to heed a court order requiring him to act or
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refrain from acting, once again, the power to enforce that order falls
to Congress through impeachment proceedings.
INTRODUCTION
Special Counsel Robert Mueller has just completed his investiga-
tion into extraordinary allegations that officials or agents of Russia
meddled in the 2016 U.S. presidential elections and that Americans,
including members of the 2016 presidential campaign of President
Donald J. Trump, may have conspired with them (the “Mueller Inves-
tigation”).1  In his final report to Attorney General William P. Barr,
the Special Counsel unequivocally cleared President Trump and other
Americans of any wrongdoing on the claim of conspiracy. He chose to
draw no conclusion on the question of whether the President ob-
structed justice by interfering with the investigation, and instead,
presented the available evidence for both sides of the question. The
Attorney General, in consultation with the Deputy Attorney General
Rod Rosenstein, then concluded that the evidence was “not sufficient
to establish that the President committed an obstruction-of-justice of-
fense.”2  The Mueller investigation, like past investigations related to
Presidents, raises numerous questions about the constitutional vulner-
ability of a sitting American President to indictment and prosecution
for alleged criminal behavior.3  While the Constitution allows a prose-
1. At press time, the Special Counsel’s report had not yet been made available to the
public, however, Attorney General Barr provided notice of its principal conclusions in a letter to
the majority and minority leaders of the House and Senate Judiciary Committees. Letter from
Attorney General William P. Barr to Senator Lindsey Graham, Chairman, Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary, et al. (Mar. 4, 2019) (on file with author) (“Barr Letter”). The Barr Letter further
noted that Justice Department regulations allow the Attorney General to waive all or part of
that confidentially if waiver is in the public interest. Barr stated that his “goal and intent is to
release as much of the Special Counsel’s report as I can consistent with applicable law, regula-
tions, and Departmental policies.” Id. at 4. See also e.g., Rebecca R. Ruiz & Marc Landler,
Robert Mueller, Former F.B.I. Director, is Named Special Counsel for Russia Investigation, N.Y.
TIMES, May 17, 2017,  https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/17/us/politics/robert-mueller-special-
counsel-russia-investigation.html (last visited Feb. 10, 2019). DOJ appointed Mueller pursuant to
regulations allowing the appointment of a Special Counsel to avoid a conflict of interest or when
such an appointment would be in the public interest. See 28 C.F.R. 600.1 et seq.
2. See Barr Letter, supra, at 2, 3. The Special Counsel did press criminal charges against a
number of Russian nationals and entities. Id. at 2.
3. In the modern era, investigations of two other presidents have raised similar questions
of presidential vulnerability to prosecution.  One is the investigation of President William J.
Clinton, led by Independent Counsel Kenneth Starr. Timeline, WASH. POST, https://www.wash
ingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/special/whitewater/timeline.htm (last visited Nov. 11, 2018). Starr
recommended impeachment of Clinton for lying to a grand jury about and engaging in other
coverup with respect to a consensual extramarital affair with a 21-year-old a White House intern.
Clinton was acquitted.  Alison Mitchell, The President’s Acquittal: The Overview; Clinton Acquit-
ted Decisively: No Majority on Either Charge, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 13, 1999), https://www.nytimes.
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cution of a former President after an impeachment conviction,4
whether it allows a sitting President to be indicted, subpoenaed, or
prosecuted before an impeachment is less clear.
The Constitution’s text is silent (or at best, ambiguous), on
whether a sitting President can be indicted and prosecuted.  The only
provision mentioning an “arrest” or hinting at prosecution of a sitting
officer is found in Article I, § 6.  The Speech or Debate Clause states
in part, “for any Speech or Debate in either House, they shall not be
questioned in any other place.”5
Noting this silence (or ambiguity) in the text, scholars and other
knowledgeable commentators have expressed divergent opinions.
Some have argued that a sitting President can be prosecuted.6  Others,
com/1999/02/13/us/president-s-acquittal-overview-clinton-acquitted-decisively-no-majority-
for.html (last visited Feb. 10, 2019).
The other criminal investigation of a sitting President involved President Richard M. Nixon.
Nixon was accused of involvement in a break-in into the Democratic National Committee head-
quarters, then at the Watergate Hotel.  The investigation was led by Special Prosecutor Leon
Jaworski. Like Starr, Jaworski made his report to Congress.  The matter ended when, facing
impeachment and possible conviction, President Nixon resigned from office. See, e.g., Carroll
Kilpatrick, Nixon Resigns, WASH. POST (Aug. 9. 1974), https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/
national/longterm/watergate/articles/080974-3.htm (last visited Feb. 10, 2019).
4. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3 (emphasis added) (“the Party convicted shall nevertheless be
liable and subject to Indictment, Trial, Judgment and Punishment, according to Law”).
5. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 1. The language was likely patterned on language in some
state constitutions and the following language from the English Bill of Rights: “[T]he freedom of
speech and debates or proceedings in Parliament ought not to be impeached or questioned in
any court or place out of Parliament.’” See Chapter 2, Freedom of Speech and Article 9 of the Bill
of Rights (Article 9 of the Bill of Rights 1689). See also e.g., MA. CONST., 1780, ch. 1, § 3, art x
(“no member of the house of representatives shall be arrested or held to bail on mense process,
during his going unto, returning from, or his attending the general assembly.” Parliament.uk,
https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/jt199899/jtselect/jtpriv/43/4306.htm (last visited Feb. 10,
2019). See also MD. CONST., Decl. of Rights art. VIII (providing freedom of speech and debates,
or proceedings in the Legislature, ought not to be impeached in any other court or judicature).
6. E.g., Laurence Tribe, The Constitution Rules Out Immunity for Sitting Presidents, BOS-
TON GLOBE (Dec. 10, 2018), https://www.bostonglobe.com/opinion/2018/12/10/constitution-rules-
out-sitting-president-immunity-from-criminal-prosecution/6Byq7Qw6TeJlPVUhlgABPM/story.
html (last visited Feb. 10, 2019); Walter Dellinger, Yes, You Can Indict the President, N.Y TIMES
(Mar. 26, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/26/opinion/indict-president-trial.html; Michael
Avenatti, The Case for Indicting Trump, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 13, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/
2018/09/13/opinion/michael-avenatti-trump-indictment-stormy-daniels.html (last visited Feb. 10,
2019); BARRY H. BERKE, NOAH BOOKBINDER, & NORMAN EISEN, PRESIDENTIAL OBSTRUCTION
OF JUSTICE: THE CASE OF DONALD J. TRUMP, 151–61 (2018) (rejecting claims that President
cannot be indicted); Ronald D. Rotunda, Can Trump Be Indicted? Are Sitting Presidents Im-
mune from Prosecution?, NEWSWEEK (Aug. 15, 2017, 06:50 AM), http://www.newsweek.com/can-
trump-be-indicted-are-sitting-presidents-immune-prosecution-650484 (last visited Feb. 10, 2019);
Garrett Epps, The Only Way to Find Out if the President Can Be Indicted, THE ATLANTIC
(May 23, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2018/05/presidential-indictment/5609
57/ (discussing various views); Susan Bloch, Can We Indict a Sitting President? 2 NEXUS 7 (1997)
(discussing views of Professors A. Amar; J. Bybee; E. Chemerinsky; T. Eastland; E. Freedman;
S. Howe; B. Kalt and others; Eric M. Freedman, Achieving Political Adulthood, 2 NEXUS 67, 84
(1997); Eric. M. Freedman, The Law as King and the King as Law: Is a President Immune from
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however, say he cannot be.  Some of those argue that he is absolutely
immune, either by the Constitution directly or indirectly because an
indictment and trial would so interfere with presidential obligations,
that it should be barred while the President is in office.7  Another has
argued that if performing duties delegated to him under the Constitu-
tion, the President is immune, regardless of motive.8  Still others ques-
tion the assumptions of those who say he can be prosecuted.9
Even lawyers who have acted as counsel for the government are
not on one accord.  In 1973, the Office of Legal Counsel opined that a
sitting President cannot be prosecuted.10  In 1998, during the investi-
gation of President William “Bill” Clinton, Independent Counsel Ken-
neth Starr commissioned an opinion from Professor Ronald Rotunda.
Professor Rotunda opined that a sitting President could be indicted
under the Constitution, but he also said statutory authority was a pre-
requisite.  He concluded that the then-existing Independent Counsel
Criminal Prosecution Before Impeachment? 20 HASTINGS L. Q. 7 (1992) (hereinafter “Freedman,
Law as King”).
7. See Dershowitz: Sitting Presidents Cannot Be Indicted, FOX NEWS (June 20, 2017), http://
insider.foxnews.com/2017/06/20/alan-dershowitz-sitting-presidents-cant-be-indicted-russia-trump
-impeach (last visited Feb. 10, 2019); Keith King, Indicting the President: Can A Sitting President
Be Criminally Indicted?, 30 SW. U. L. REV. 417, 418 (2001); Akhil Reed Amar, On Prosecuting
Presidents, 27 HOFSTRA L. REV. 671, 671 (1999); Jay S. Bybee, Who Executes the Executioner, 2
NEXUS 53, 56-57 (1997); Akhil Reed Amar &  Brian C. Kalt, The Presidential Privilege Against
Prosecution, 2 NEXUS 11, 11 (1997) (basing conclusion on “the best view of constitutional text,
history, structure, and precedent,”  citing prior governmental memos, Judge Robert Bork,  and
others and claiming prosecution would incapacitate a sitting President). Joseph Isenbergh, Im-
peachment and Presidential Immunity from Judicial Process, 18 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 53 (1999)
(sitting president immune from compulsory judicial process and only subject to impeachment).
But see Greenberg, Mark, Can Trump Obstruct Justice? NYR DAILY (Jan. 4, 2018), https://
ssrn.com/abstract=3202398 (last visited Feb. 10, 2019) (arguing that Dershowitz view would lead
to almost everything a President did being constitutional).
8. Alan Dershowitz, You Cannot Charge the President with Obstruction of Justice for Exer-
cising his Constitutional Power, WASH. EXAMINER (Dec. 4, 2017, 8:14 AM), https://www.washing
tonexaminer.com/alan-dershowitz-you-cannot-charge-a-president-with-obstruction-of-justice-
for-exercising-his-constitutional-power (last visited Feb. 10, 2019).  However, Dershowitz says
that if the President is acting outside those powers, he can be indicted. Id. See also Isenbergh,
supra note 6. R
9. E.g., Philip Bobbitt, Can the President Be Indicted? A Response to Laurence Tribe,
LAWFARE BLOG (Dec. 17, 8:00 AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/can-president-be-indicted-re
sponse-laurence-tribe (arguing Professor Tribe’s view, discussed supra note 6, depends on debat- R
able assumptions).
10. Memorandum from Robert G. Dixon Jr. on Amenability of the President, Vice Presi-
dent, and Other Civil Officers to Federal Criminal Prosecution While in Office (Sept. 24, 1973)
(on file with Department of Justice at https://fas.org/irp/agency/doj/olc/092473.pdf (last visited
Feb. 10, 2019) (arguing that “an impeachment proceeding is the only appropriate way to deal
with a President while in office.”).  The same year, then-Solicitor General Robert Bork argued in
a brief that the President can be indicted.  Memorandum of the United States Concerning the
Vice President’s Claim of Constitutional Immunity (Oct. 5, 1973) (on file with publisher).
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statute gave such power to Starr.11  But he also concluded that a Presi-
dent could fire his prosecutors without “obstructing justice” under a
statute.12  Later, considering the Special Counsel regulations under
which Mueller operated, Rotunda opined that Mueller had no author-
ity to indict a sitting President.13  In 1998, during the Clinton presi-
dency, Congress also held hearings on the question of whether a
President could be subpoenaed, indicted or prosecuted.  They heard a
clash of views from legal scholars and lawyers.14  And in 2000, the
Office of the Independent Counsel revisited its 1973 opinion and reaf-
firmed that their answer was “No,” the President is not subject to or-
dinary prosecution.15
Those who have addressed this question have looked to a com-
mon group of sources.  They have analyzed notes of debates during
the Constitution’s drafting.  Some have looked to state ratification
convention notes.16  Many have analyzed the constitutions of the inde-
pendent states prior to the founding.17 The Federalist Papers, are fre-
11. Memorandum of Ronald D. Rotunda, Professor of Law, to Kenneth Starr, Independent
Counsel (May 13, 1998), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/07/22/us/document-Savage-
NYT-FOIA-Starr-memo-presidential.html (last visited Feb. 10, 2019) (disclosed in response to
New York Times reporter’s FOIA request and stating, given then existing independent counsel
statute, President can face federal indictment for activities unrelated to his official duties as
President, but reserving judgment on state indictments or indictments in the absence of statutory
authority. The Independent Counsel statute expired in 1999). Roberto Suro, As Special Counsel
Act Expires, Power Will Shift to Reno, WASH. POST (June 30, 1999), https://www.washington
post.com/archive/politics/1999/06/30/as-special-counsel-law-expires-power-will-shift-to-reno/d091
aa10-16fb-4939-b8c8-ab3eacf93a25/?utm_term=.a35fc816dfd7 (last visited Feb. 10, 2019).
12. Rotunda, supra note 11.
13. See Ronald Rotunda, The President Can Be Indicted, Just Not By Mueller, WASH. POST
(July 27, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/the-president-can-be-indicted—just-
not-by-mueller/2017/07/27/a597b922-721d-11e7-8f39-eeb7d3a2d304_story.html?utm_term=.5077
722e2942 (last visited Feb. 10, 2019; arguing the Constitution does not prohibit indictment of a
president, but that the Special Counsel statute authorizing the Mueller Investigation “most
likely” does not give Mueller the power to do so).  For the regulations, see supra note 1.
14. Impeachment or Indictment:  Is a Sitting President Subject to the Compulsory Criminal
Process? Hearings Before the Subcomm. On the Constitution, Federalism, and Property Rights of
the Senate Comm, on the Judiciary, 105th Cong (1998).
15. Memorandum Opinion for the Attorney General (Oct. 16, 2000) (on file with Depart-
ment of Justice at https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/olc/opinions/2000 /10/31/op-olc-v024-
p0222_0.pdf) (last visited Feb. 10, 2019; reaffirming 1973 view that indictment would “would
unconstitutionally undermine the capacity of the executive branch to perform its constitutionally
assigned functions.”).
16. E.g., Freedman, Law as King, supra note 6, at 17; Ronald D. Rotunda, An Essay on the
Constitutional Parameters of Federal Impeachment, 76 KY. L. J. 707, 728, n. 114 (1988).
17. For significant exploration of state constitutions in the impeachment context, see, e.g.,
Brian C. Kalt, The Constitutional Case for the Impeachability of Former Federal Officials: An
Analysis of the Law, History and Practice of Late Impeachment, 6 TEX. REV. L. & POL’Y 13, 29-
39 (2001); P. HOFFER & N. HULL, IMPEACHMENT IN AMERICA, 1635-1805, at 68–77 (1984).
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quently consulted.18 Although written after the Constitution was
drafted, they are, at least, close in time and authored by those directly
involved in the Constitutional mission.  Thus, it must be conceded that
they reflect at least what some of the Founders thought.  But those
same factors might have led authors to insist on presenting only their
own interpretations, even if in conflict with other drafters’ views.
Some consider Justice Joseph Story’s writings to be authoritative.19
Story was born in 1779; he was, therefore, eight years old when the
Constitution was signed in 1787.  Though a precocious child for sure,
he likely had no first-hand knowledge of the Founders’ intended
meaning and only indirect insight into how the people of a young na-
tion would have understood its language, that is, its original mean-
ing.20  Alternatively, some scholars rely upon court cases decided long
after the Constitution was written.  But in terms of discerning how the
Founding generation thought, such later-decided cases pose the same
problems of other later-written commentary.  Moreover, judges may
face pressures to be consistent with prior doctrine, even when indica-
tions are that they are in error as a matter of original intent or original
meaning.
Discerning the Founders’ intent in this instance is also fraught
with difficulty given the Constitution’s ambiguous “silence.”  It is pos-
sible that the Founders did not specifically address prosecution of a
sitting President in the Constitution because they could not agree on
it.  Or perhaps they did agree, which is why they left the subject out.
Moreover, although the office of the Attorney General existed in co-
lonial times and within states after independence, and while the office
18. E.g., THE FEDERALIST NOS. 65, 69, 77 (Alexander Hamilton).  The first of the Federalist
Papers are much closer appearing in October of 1787, months after the Constitution was drafted.
See Primary Documents in American History: The Federalist Papers, LIBR. OF CONGRESS (2005),
https://www.loc.gov/rr/program/bib/ourdocs/federalist.html (last visited Feb. 10, 2019.
19. E.g., JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES
(1833).
20. Some scholars frame the constitutional meaning inquiry in terms of the “original public
meaning,” rather than original intent.  In a nutshell, the original public meaning refers to how
people would have understood the words in the relevant era.  For a discussion of the debate, see,
e.g., Richard H. Fallon, The Many and Varied Roles of History in Constitutional Adjudication, 90
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1753 (2015).  Some also argue that how the Founders originally felt about
their approach should not always govern the day. E.g., Transcript of Oral Argument at 39 (ll. 14-
25)–40 (ll. 1-8), Gamble v. United States (No.17-646) (Kagan, J., commenting that while some
members of the Supreme Court may think original intent is the “alpha and omega of every
constitutional question . . . there are other people on this bench who do not.”)  On the other
hand, I suggest that even those who would eschew dogged adherence to an original intent or
original public meaning analysis, would at least begin with that inquiry, in order to determine
whether they must move beyond it and what they are trading away when they do.
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would have been quite familiar to the Founders,21 the federal statute
authorizing the U.S. Attorney General did not exist until after the
Constitution was signed.22
This article takes a deep dive into the British and colonial back-
drop of the Constitution to investigate how the Founders might have
answered the question of whether a sitting President can be prose-
cuted.  To these ends, in addition to consulting the commonly- con-
sulted pool of resources.  I look at some lesser-used ones:
Parliamentary journals and records of Parliamentary procedures, the
Calendar of State Papers from the British National Archives,23 British
caselaw and American and British newspapers from the eighteenth
century.
Of course, scholars have debated whether we should accept that
the British model for impeachment played a significant role in the
Founders’ discussions.  I would offer several reasons why I believe it
did.  First, it should be remembered that in 1787, the Founders were
only eleven years away from the time when they first declared their
independence.  The British model for impeachment was a natural
starting point because it was the model with which they were all famil-
iar.  Second, Blackstone’s Commentaries, a legal Bible for Americans
of the time, focused on the British model in its discussion of impeach-
ment.  Third, several of the states had used the British model as a
starting point in their constitutions after Independence.24  Fourth, con-
trary to a common assumption that Americans had angrily “moved
on” from their divorce, in fact, they frequently looked back upon En-
gland and regularly checked in.  Newspapers regularly ran stories,
21. For the role of royally-appointed attorneys general during the colonial period, see dis-
cussion infra Section I.A.  For an independent state attorney general reference, see, e.g., MA.
CONST., 1780 art. IX.
22. The office of the U.S. Attorney General was established in the Judiciary Act of 1789, ch.
20, § 35, 1 Stat. 73, 92–93.
23. The calendars are 41 volumes of summaries of handwritten correspondence from the
royally-appointed colonial leaders in America and the West Indies to the British Secretaries of
State, relating to colonial affairs and received between 1574 and 1739.  The notations largely
reflect the substance of the original papers. See CALENDAR OF STATE PAPERS, COLONIAL
AMERICA AND THE WEST INDIES, 1574-1739, BRITISH HISTORY ONLINE, https://www.british-his
tory.ac.uk/search/series/cal-state-papers—colonial—america-west-indies (hereinafter “CALEN-
DAR OF STATE PAPERS”) (last visited Feb. 13, 2019). Thus, they reflect the early conflicts be-
tween the colonies and the Crown.
24. E.g., MD. CONST. Decl. of Rights, art. III (“That the inhabitants of Maryland are entitled
to the common law of England”); NY. CONST. art. XXXV (declaring “that such parts of the
common law of England, and of the statute law of England and Great Britain, and of the acts of
the legislature of the colony of New York, as together did form the law of the said colony on the
19th day of April, in the year of our Lord one thousand seven hundred and seventy-five, shall be
and continue the law of this State”).
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even columns, with news of what was going on in England, thus dem-
onstrating that ordinary Americans remained keenly interested in
what was going on there.25  Consider that this author’s search for the
word “Parliament” in Readex’s Early American Newspapers database,
between January 1, 1786 and September 16, 1787 (the day before the
Constitution was signed) yielded 9,692 newspapers that used the word.
Overwhelmingly, these are references to the British Parliament.  That
figure does not include the papers that reference the “Commons” or
“House of Lords,” or report the decisions of British courts.  And it
does not include newspapers found on other databases.  Indeed, at the
same time that the Americans were drafting the Constitution, they
were reading in American papers about British attempts to impeach
and later try British subject Warren Hastings.26  This keen interest in
Great Britain makes sense because as immigrants, or the children or
grandchildren of immigrants, many Americans of the Founding Gen-
eration still had family in England.  And America was, after all a su-
perpower within its time.  Hoping to found a new nation, the
Founders naturally looked to other examples for ideas.  And there is a
fifth reason to look to the British model.  Hamilton, in Federalist No.
65, tells us that the drafters looked to it.27  No, the Americans were
definitely not going back to their old relationship.  But they did not
discount it as a total loss from which nothing could be learned.
25. Every newspaper with a significantly circulation regularly ran stories of what was going
on in England. E.g., European Politicks, England, London, October 27, AMERICAN HERALD,
Jan 2, 1786 at 1; Foreign News, London, October 9, NEW-YORK PACKET, Jan. 2, 1787, at 2.
Sometimes they repeated verbatim stories from European papers. From the London General
Advertiser, CONNECTICUT JOURNAL, July 25, 1787, at 2 (on Hastings trial); History of the Late
War in America from the British Annual Register, for 1778, MASSACHUSETTS SPY (PUBLISHED AS
THE WORCESTER MAGAZINE), Jan. 4, 1787, at 479. Newspapers often reported British news
three to six months after it had happened. Much of the news came from newspapers brought by
ship and from sea captains. E.g., By Tuesday’s Eastern Post Paris, April 20, U.S. CHRONICLE,
July 12, 1787, at 2 (referencing news of Warren Hasting’ impeachment trial from Captain Hunter
of The George).
26. E.g., Extract from a Letter From Turin, Feb. 10, INDEP. J., May 2, 1787, at 1 (discussing
trial); Halifax, July 12, INDEP. GAZATTEER, Aug. 4, 1787 at 2 (letter to newspaper sending an
excerpt of articles of impeachment against Hastings so that Americans could review them and
noting the spectacle of the great “Nabob” on his knees for four hours as the articles were read);
see also London, House of Commons, Feb. 7, 1787, AMERICAN HERALD, June 4, 1787, at 1;
Legislative, BOSTON GAZETTE & THE COUNTRY J., July 2, 1787, at 2; Legislative, INDEP. GAZET-
TEER, June 23, 1787, at 2; Legislative, British House of Lords, Monday, May 8, NEW HAMP-
SHIRE-SPY, July 21, 1787, at 310; By Tuesday’s Eastern Post Paris, supra; Introduction to the
Articles of Impeachment of High Crimes and Misdemeanors Against Warren Hastings, NEW-
YORK PACKET, Aug. 14, 1787, at 2.   For more on the Hastings case, see discussion infra begin-
ning at Section I.B.1.c.
27. FEDERALIST NO. 65 (Hamilton) (“The Powers of the Senate”).
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Believing that we can learn more from British and colonial his-
tory, I add this supplement to the astounding body of existing consti-
tutional and historical literature on impeachment.  I seek to expand
our understanding of the larger context in which the Founders wrote
the Constitution.  As part of this effort, I tie in the independent state
constitutions in existence prior to the Founding.  I offer here a new
framework for understanding how to analyze the question, that is, that
we should consider the impeachment provisions as jurisdictional.  It is
not my goal to discuss here whether or not the answers the Founders
would give are practical or wise in the present day.  For now, I wish to
establish the relevance of British history to the question and why im-
peachment and removal provisions are jurisdictional.  And I want to
begin a discussion of how this understanding should shape our under-
standing of prosecutions of sitting Presidents.  I do this by positing
how the Founders might have answered several questions relating to
the issue.  Further defining the contours of this perspective, I reserve
until another day.
Part I considers British approaches both to prosecution and to
impeachment before American independence.  It discusses tensions
between the King’s prosecutors and local grand juries in seeking jus-
tice against British soldiers and officials. It also discusses the ability of
the King’s courts and the colonies to prosecute officials for high
crimes and misdemeanors and why, in the colonies’ case, the possibil-
ity of prosecution was insufficient.  And it discusses the efforts of the
colonists to remove royally-appointed authorities from office, despite
the Crown’s denying them impeachment authority.
Part II notes how the courts of the common law and Parliament,
acting as a court of impeachment, had concurrent jurisdiction and how
the British balanced jurisdictional squabbles between these courts at
home.  Here, I focus on a case that produced a clash of jurisdictions
between Parliament and the King’s courts: the prosecution(s) of Ed-
ward Fitzharris for treason.  From this and other precedent, I propose
that the Founders would tell us that while concurrent jurisdiction ex-
ists, prosecutions in the two courts for the same crimes at the same
time is not possible.  When Parliament properly issued articles of im-
peachment, the proceedings in common law courts, including grand
jury proceedings, were to be automatically stayed.
Part III then considers how the Founders approached impeach-
ment in the Constitution.  It considers the Convention notes and
Hamilton’s views.  It also argues that state constitutions after indepen-
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dence but before the Constitution, demonstrate that the Founders
were well aware tht there were many ways to allocate jurisdiction in
prosecuting a Chief Magistrate.  I show how the Founders allocated
criminal jurisdiction between courts of law and the High Court of Im-
peachment, how they separated removal from punishment, and how
they dealt with the problem of double jeopardy.
Finally, Part IV offers up the Founders’ answer to the various
questions surrounding whether a sitting President can be prosecuted.
It argues that they would say they considered the prosecution of a
President as raising a jurisdictional question.  And it argues that the
key jurisdictional inquiry is whether or not the threatened
prosecutorial action would result in removal of the President, includ-
ing a partial or constructive removal, by curtailing his discretion when
performing his constitutional duties.28
The matter of prosecuting a sitting President raises other ques-
tions that I do not examine here.  I leave to another day an explora-
tion of the definition of “high crimes and misdemeanors;”29 the
questions of whether Congress can impeach for actions that are not
criminal; of whether Congress can reach persons other than current
government officials; of whether impeachment can occur after one has
left office; of whether a trial after impeachment and conviction raises
a possibility of issue preclusion; and of whether Congress can impose
penalties other than removal and a ban from public office upon an
impeached official.  Certainly, some of the arguments put forth here
28. The notion that constructive removal is a central question in presidential prosecutions
has been raised Judge MacKinnon of the D.C. Circuit in Nixon v. Sirica, 487 F.2d 700 (1973). The
case concerned the investigation of a break-in into the Democratic National Committee head-
quarters. The Court considered whether it could enforce a subpoena duces tecum to require
President Richard Nixon to produce tapes of his conversations with others in the White House.
While agreeing the Court had jurisdiction to decide the question of executive privilege, MacKin-
non dissented from the majority’s finding that the subpoena was enforceable. He wrote:
Sound policy reasons preclude criminal prosecution until after a President has been
impeached and convicted.  To indict and prosecute a President or to arrest him before
trial, would be constructively and effectively to remove him from office, an action pro-
hibited by the Impeachment Clause.  A President must remain free to travel, to meet,
confer and act on a continual basis and be unimpeded in the discharge of his constitu-
tional duties. The real intent of the Impeachment Clause, then, is to guarantee that the
President always will be available to fulfill his constitutional duties.
Id. at 163.  MacKinnon said he would recognize an absolute privilege for confidential Presiden-
tial communications. Id. at 81.  Later, in U.S v Nixon, the Supreme Court held that executive
privilege is not absolute but should yield to a narrowly-tailored subpoena duces tecum. United
States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
29. Id. art. II, § 4 (“The President, Vice President and all civil Officers of the United States,
shall be removed from Office on Impeachment for, and Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other
high Crimes and Misdemeanors”).  Scholars have debated the meaning of these terms. E.g., Isen-
bergh, supra note 7.
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could apply to state prosecutions.  This article focuses solely on fed-
eral prosecutions.30  I also do not discuss civil actions against the Pres-
ident.  And I take no position on the propriety of the Mueller
investigation; on whether or not a particular President should be in-
dicted, impeached or convicted; or on whether federal courts should
intervene to stay any prosecution in a given case.  My goal here is to
zero in on how the Founders would have understood the intersection
of prosecuting a sitting president and impeaching and trying one for
criminal behavior.
I. THE BRITISH BACKDROP FOR PROSECUTIONS AND
IMPEACHMENTS
I contend that, despite independence, the Founders of the consti-
tutional period would have understood prosecutorial and impeach-
ment powers with respect to a Chief Magistrate in the context of their
colonial experience and its British common law backdrop.  This sec-
tion thus discusses that backdrop for prosecutions and impeachments.
A. Prosecution by Common Law or Statute
1. Approaches in England/Great Britain
Under the common law, the primary means of commencing a
prosecution were through (1) an indictment by a grand jury or (2)
charges by way of an information presented to a judicial officer.31
The tradition of the grand jury began in 1166 with an edict by
King Henry II, the “Assize of Clarendon”.32  The English grand jury
was required to have between twelve and twenty-three people.33  An
indictment was a written statement of criminal charges against an indi-
vidual, as to which a grand jury had issued its approval.34
30. For exploration of many of the legal questions relating to impeachment generally, see,
e.g., RAOUL BERGER, IMPEACHMENT: THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS (1973); Cass R. Sun-
stein, IMPEACHMENT,  A CITIZEN’S GUIDE (2017); Charles Black, Jr. IMPEACHMENT: A HAND-
BOOK (Philip Bobbitt, ed. 2018).
31. W.S. Holdsworth, The History of Criminal Information, 1 CAN. BAR REV. 300 (1923)
(hereinafter, “Holdsworth, Information”); see also 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES
*301–07 (discussing indictments); id. at *308–12  (discussing informations).
32. 1 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 321 (7th ed. 1956) (origin in 1166).
For the text of the Assize, see The Avalon Project. Assize of Clarendon, 1166, http://ava-
lon.law.yale.edu/medieval/assizecl.asp (citing WILLIAM STUBBS, SELECT CHARTERS AND OTHER
ILLUSTRATIONS OF ENGLISH LAW, 143–146 (1913) (available at, https://archive.org/details/select
chartersa01stubgoog/page/n4) (last visited Feb. 10, 2019).
33. 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 31, at *302. R
34. E.g., 4 BLACKSTONE supra note 31, at *302 (referring to an indictment as a written
statement of charges); see also SIR JAMES ASTRY, A GENERAL CHARGE TO ALL GRAND JURIES
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In England and early America, the grand jury was sometimes
called the “grand inquest.”35  English grand juries had broad powers
to investigate and present accusations (“presentments”) on their own,
without the Attorney General.36  A written statement of the charges
(an indictment or “bill”) was prepared either by the Attorney General
or by a judicial officer.37  If convinced by evidence they had gathered
or that was presented to them, the grand jury signed the bill “vera” (or
“true”), thus indicting; if not convinced, the grand jury wrote “Ignora-
mus”, thus indicating that they deemed the evidence insufficient.38
Although at first, their proceedings were in public, their deliberations
were made secret in 1368 to protect them from Crown influence.39
4–5 (1703); Copy of a Presentment Made by the Grand Jury of Middlesex to the Judges of the
King’s Bench: Trinity Term, STAMFORD MERCURY, July 18, 1723, at 32 (indicting persons dissem-
inating publications critical of government-sponsored religion) (provided courtesy of the British
Newspaper Archive and British Library Board).
35. E.g., London, AM. WEEKLY MERCURY, Apr. 16–23, 1724, at 3 (American paper refer-
ring to “Grand Inquest” indictment in London).
36. See 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 31, at *301; 4 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, & JEROLD H. ISRAEL,
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 15.2 (g) (1984) (“[T]he grand jury at common law could bring charges
on its own initiative through the use of the presentment. This allowed the grand jury to initiate a
prosecution over the opposition of the prosecutor.”). See also BLACKSTONE, supra note 31, at
298 (“A presentment, properly speaking, is the notice taken by a grand jury of any offense from
their own knowledge or observation without any bill of indictment laid before them at the suit of
the king . . . .”).
For discussion of the early grand jury process, see RICHARD GUDE, I PRACTICE ON THE
CROWN’S SIDE OF THE COURT OF THE KING’S BENCH AND THE PRACTICE OF THE SESSIONS, THE
GENERAL RULES OF COURT. FROM THE REIGN OF JAMES I, TO THE PRESENT TIME 85–96 (1828)
(discussing the “Mode of Preferring Indictments in the King’s Bench”).
Some have argued the indictment was and is jurisdictional in felony cases. See Roger A.
Fairfax, Jr., The Jurisdictional Heritage of the Grand Jury Clause, 91 MINN. L. REV. 398, 409
(2008) (arguing that an indictment was a jurisdictional prerequisite to prosecution of some felo-
nies, contrary to later Criminal Procedure Rules allowing waiver of same); Renee B. Lettow,
Note, Reviving Federal Grand Jury Presentments, 103 YALE L.J. 1333, 1337 (1994) (discussing
history of grand jury presentments and indictments); see also BERNARD SCHWARTZ, THE GREAT
RIGHT OF MANKIND: A History OF THE AMERICAN BILL OF RIGHTS, 76–77 (arguing that North
Carolina’s 1776 Decl. of Rights guaranteeing the right to indictment was the “direct precursor”
to the Grand Jury Clause in the 5th Amendment).
37. E.g., STAMFORD MERCURY, Nov. 10, 1715, at 239 (British newspaper referencing Attor-
ney General presenting indictments for high treason to grand jury on which they wrote vera); 4
BLACKSTONE, supra note 31, at *301 (referring to an “officer of the court” framing an indictment
after a grand jury takes notice of an offense).
38. Id.; 1 FRANCIS BACON, THE ELEMENTS OF THE COMMON LAWES OF ENGLAND 16 (1629)
(noting a judge would present the grand jury with a written indictment and the grand jury would
write upon it “either Billa vera [i.e., true bill], and then the prisoner standeth indicted, or else
Ignoramus, & then hee is not touched”); 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 31, at *305–06.  Blackstone R
translates “Ignoramus” as “[‘]we know nothing of it[’], intimating that, though the facts might
possibly be true, the truth did not appear to them.” Id. at *305.
39. M. FRANKEL & G. NAFTALIS, THE GRAND JURY AN INSTITUTION ON TRIAL 7 (1977)
(discussing when grand jury stopped being public). Cf. JOHN HAWLES, THE GRAND JURY MAN’S
OATH AND OFFICE EXPLAINED AND THE RIGHTS OF ENGLISH-MEN ASSERTED, A DIALOGUE
BETWEEN A BARRISTER AT LAW AND A GRAND-JURY MAN 5–6 (1680) (anonymous pamphlet
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The Crown could also proceed without a grand jury, by informa-
tion, directly presenting evidence to a judge and asking the judge to
find the evidence sufficient for a trial.  In their seminal History of En-
glish Law, Pollack and Maitland noted broad debate over the history
of criminal information.”40  The earliest instance they could find of a
trial without a grand jury indictment occurred during the reign of Ed-
ward I.41  The King brought a man to trial for treason and felony.42
The information is almost as old as the grand jury indictment.”43
Holdsworth traced it to the thirteenth century as well, but said it likely
arose before formal statutes, “very naturally to the centralized royal
justice of the thirteenth century.”44  For example, he noted that if
someone took property that belonged to the King, the King could in-
form his courts, and they could act.45  He asserted that the informal
practice was later formally developed through legislation.46
The earliest statute allowing informations may have been the stat-
ute of Winton (or statute of Winchester) passed in 1285 at the behest
of Edward I.47  The statute expressly applied to felonies and misde-
meanors alike.48  Noting the growth in crime and difficulty of jury con-
viction, it allowed constables and other watchmen to keep the peace
and gave them certain powers to bring perceived lawbreakers (includ-
ing “strangers” and “suspicious” persons) before a Justice.49  It pro-
referencing the secrecy obligation and oath); see also ASTRY, supra note 34, at 9 (referring to
secrecy obligation & the oath).
40. See 2 FREDERICK POLLACK AND FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND, HISTORY OF ENGLISH
LAW BEFORE THE TIME OF EDWARD I 662 (2d ed. 1898).
41. Id.
42. Id. (Treason and felony are separately referenced. In the seventeenth century, as the
Fitzharris case infra demonstrates, a person charged with treason was denied certain rights. See,
e.g., note 143, infra (court denying Fitzharris copy of indictment because he was charged with
high treason).
43. 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 31, at *309 (stating the information is almost as old as the
common law itself); HOLDSWORTH, Information, supra note 31, at 300;
44. Holdsworth, Information, supra note 31.
45. Id. at 301.
46. Id. at 301.  Holdsworth notes that there were civil and criminal informations and, differ-
ent kinds of each. Id at 301–02 (discussing different types).
47. 13 Edw. I. st. 2, c. 4. (1285); see also 1 HANNIS TAYLOR, ORIGIN OF ENGLISH CONSTITU-
TION 503 (1904); cf. 2 MATTHEW HALE, ET AL., HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONAE. THE HIS-
TORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN (1st American ed.) 94–96 (1847) (discussing power of
constables and watchmen; Statute of Winton authorization).
The Statute of Winton (a/k/a Statute of Winchester) also required that every person be-
tween the ages of 13 and 60, take up arms and be available to serve as watchmen, constables or
other peacekeepers according to the value of their lands. 13 Edw. I, st. 2, c. 4.
48. 13 Edw. I. st. 2, c. 4. (1285).
49. Id.; see also 2 HALE, supra note 47, at 95, 96 (discussing different types of watchmen and
constables assigned to keep the peace and their ability to bring prisoners on charges before a
justice of the peace).
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vided that “inquests” could be held by the “lord of the ville”
(essentially the mayor).50  Holdsworth suggests that by the time of
Henry VIII’s reign, the King had “a somewhat indefinite power of
proceeding by way of information for offenses under the degree of
felony.”51
2. Approaches in the American Colonies
Given the separate founding histories of each colony and state
sovereignty immediately after American independence, each state has
its own history with respect to charging persons with crime and prose-
cuting them, including the evolution of grand jury authority.52  From
the earlier times, however, colonial grand juries operated much like
English grand juries in their investigative functions, dealing with a
wide range of misbehavior, both misdemeanors and felonies.53
Conflicts between the Crown and locals began to strain the rela-
tionship between the Crown’s attorneys and the grand juries.  A regu-
lar source of American concern was the conduct of British soldiers.  In
The evolution of some statutory exceptions to grand jury presentment is recounted in King
v. Bridgewater and Taunton Canal Co., 108 Eng. Rep. 814 (1827) (also known as King v. Justices
of Somersetshire) discussed infra at note 51. The Bridgewater & Taunton case cites to LAMBARD
EIRENARCHA 508. E.g., WILLIAM LAMBARD, EIRENARCHA: OR OF THE OFFICE OF THE JUSTICES
OF THE PEACE IN FOURE BOOKS 508 (1599).
50. 13 Edw. I. st. 2, c. 4. (1285).
51. Holdsworth, Information, supra note 31, at 307.  In 1827, the King’s Bench invalidated a
longstanding custom of constable presentment without a grand jury because the practice lacked
statutory authorization and was deemed to be unfair to defendants. Bridgewater & Taunton,
supra note 49, at 815.  The judges determined that the constable’s mere offer was invalid as a
presentment because it was not under oath and that if the constable could sign it, he could thus
appear before a grand jury and swear to it. With other judges concurring, Chief Justice
Tenterden stated “I am sorry to hear that the custom . . . has prevailed so long; it is clearly unjust
and illegal and must be discontinued.” Id. at 815 (noting that the presentment of a justice on his
own knowledge had, by force of statute, sometimes sufficed for a grand jury but a constable was
not a judge and no statute authorized this practice).
52. E.g., 1 PHILIP ALEXANDER BRUCE, INSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF VIRGINIA IN THE SEV-
ENTEENTH CENTURY: AN INQUIRY INTO THE RELIGIOUS, MORAL, EDUCATIONAL, LEGAL, MILI-
TARY, AND POLITICAL CONDITION OF THE PEOPLE BASED ON ORIGINAL AND
CONTEMPORANEOUS RECORDS, 607–10 (1910) (discussing operation of constables and of the
grand jury operations in early Virginia); JUDICIAL AND CIVIL HISTORY OF CONNECTICUT, 171–73
(Dwight Calhoun & J. Gilbert eds. 1895) (discussing constables and grand juries).
53. E.g. BRUCE, supra note 52, at 608–09; see also e.g., America, New York, May 4, BOSTON
EVENING-POST, May 11, 1741, at 1 (care and vigilance of grand jury has successfully discovered
gangs causing crime); Philadelphia, Jan. 1, N.H. GAZETTE & HISTORICAL CHRONICLE, Jan. 30,
1767, at 1 (letter reporting 1766 proceeding in which Attorney General presented several bills of
indictments to grand jury which then left to deliberate). For more history, see Ron. S. Chun, The
Right to Grand Jury Indictment, 26 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1457, 1461 (1989) (explaining role of
attorneys generals); id. at 1457–67; Lettow, supra note 36, at 1336–37 (explaining the history;
tensions with Crown); Robert Gilbert Johnston, The Grand Jury: Prosecutorial Abuse in the
Indictment Process, 65 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 157, 157–60 (1974) (discussing history).
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1769, a Boston newspaper reported that the Attorney General had
entered a “noti prossiqui” plea (sic) in a case involving soldiers al-
leged to have assaulted American citizens.  In other words, he pleaded
nolle prosequi or “no prosecution” for the Crown, despite the local
grand jury’s indictment.54  It said that the Crown claimed the facts did
not support some of the grand jury’s charges, and the Crown also in-
sisted that some other participants in the affair, whom the grand jury
did not indict, should be tried.55  (It seems, the Crown wanted to put
Americans involved in the conflict on trial.) Frustration with their in-
ability to use grand jury powers to curb soldier misconduct was so
significant that Americans complained of it within  the Declaration of
Independence.  They stated that the King had protected soldiers “by a
mock Trial, from punishment for any Murders which they should com-
mit on the Inhabitants of these States . . . .”56  In 1770, a newspaper
commentator complained about pressure on the grand jury to reduce
the rigor with which the grand jurymen investigated claims as well as
pressure upon them to only pay attention to prosecution’s evidence.57
Such comment suggest that grand juries did not always trust the
King’s offers.58
One letter from a royal official in the colonies to the Crown notes
the tensions in the colonies.  It stated that when the grand jury twice
refused to issue a true bill, the Court kept adding more and more
people to the grand jury until finally it got an indictment approval.59
54. E.g., Boston, Jan. 30, N.Y. JOURNAL; OR THE GEN. ADVERTISER (Mar. 2, 1769), at 1.
55. Id.
56. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE (U.S. 1776).
57. See On the Importance, Privileges and Duty of Grand Juries, N.Y. GAZETTE OR THE
WEEKLY POSTBOY, Apr. 16, 1770, at 1 (celebrating the grand jury as a protector of the rights of
Englishmen and complaining that judges were telling grand jurors that as accusers and not triers
they should “relax the Rigour of their Enquiries, after the Truth” and that “to promote a favorite
Prosecution, [some] tell them, that as Accusers and not Triers, they ought to proceed ex parte,
and hear only the Evidence offered by the Prosecutor, and that this will be a full Discharge of
their Oath).
58. Similar concerns were expressed in Canadian colonies. Mr. Majeres, His Majesty’s Attor-
ney General for Canada, His Letter to the Grand Jury of Montreal; N.Y. JOURNAL; OR THE GEN-
ERAL ADVERTISER, June 30, 1768, 2 (Crown’s Attorney General responding by letter  to grand
jury concerns that he hid evidence from the grand jury and did not bring appropriate
indictments).
59. The notation of the letter in the Calendar of State Papers reads:
Boston. April 15, 1700. At a Court of General Trials held at Newport, March 16, 1700,
narrator was foreman of a Grand Jury, which twice returned a verdict of “Ignoramus”
upon the indictments against Joseph Pembarton, John Lewis and Edward Blevin (sic)
(xvi.). The Court had already added three more to the Jury. and now added six, and, in
spite of protest and after many hours’ debate, 12 of the 21 now agreed to bring in a
Billa Vera, because the Court would not receive it otherwise. The Judges constituting
the Court were Governor Cranston, Dep. Gov. Green, Walter Clarke, Robert Carr,
James Barker, Gyles Slocom, Joseph Sheffield, Joseph Hull, etc.
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The King sometimes bypassed a colonial grand jury and proceeded by
information.60  One American colonial writer in 1770 suggested that
the option of an information was especially favored by the Crown if it
believed it could find no grand jury to indict.61  Americans also al-
lowed prosecution of crimes to be presented by constables and others
but these seem to have been lower level crimes or persons deemed
entitled to lower justice.62
This erosion of the grand jury power under Crown rule as the
Crown attempted to protect its own interests, combined with their
conception of the rights of British citizens, likely led the Founders to
include in the Constitution a right to a grand jury in the case of a
capital or “infamous” crime.63
B. Prosecution by Impeachment
Historians agree that the first use of impeachment power in En-
gland occurred in 1376 under Edward III.64  This section discusses
how the British approached the issue of impeachment.
Letter, Governor the Earl of Bellomont to the Council of Trade and Plantations, Boston (June
22, 1700) (reporting details of letter Bellomont received from Capt. Christopher Almy) in 18
CALENDAR OF STATE PAPERS, supra note 23, at 356–70, 369, https://www.british-history.ac.uk/
cal-state-papers/colonial/america-west-indies/vol18/pp354-380 (last visited Feb. 10, 2019) (nota-
tion “(sic) (xvi.)” in original).
60. PROVIDENCE GAZETTE, AND COUNTRY JOURNAL, March 30, 1770, at 51.
61. Id.
62. E.g., Sasquehanah, May 20, 1723, NEW ENGLAND COURANT, July 8–15, 1723 (Letter
referring to Justice of Peace ordering constable to bring Negro slave before him for prosecution).
Slaves were deemed property and not citizens before the Fourteenth Amendment, thus, they
would not have had even a common law right to a grand jury.
63. U.S. CONST. amend V (“No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise
infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in
the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public danger;
. . . .”
64. TAYLOR, supra note 47, at 503. Taylor says Lords Lattimer and Neville were accused by
the commons of “fraud upon the revenue” or stealing public monies. Id.; see also Craig S. Ler-
ner, Review: Impeachment, Attainder, and a True Constitutional Crisis: Lessons from the Straf-
ford Trial, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 2057, 2070, note 45 (2002) (discussing early impeachments). Says
Lerner, “The word ‘impeachment’ (or more precisely, its precursor in law French, ‘empesche-
ment’) first appeared in the Parliament Roll in 1324, and the reign of Edward III (1328-77)
witnessed a flurry of parliamentary efforts to punish royal advisors who had abused their pow-
ers.” Id. citing M.V. Clarke, FOURTEENTH CENTURY STUDIES 242 (Oxford 1937).
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1. Approaches in England/Great Britain
a. The Statement of “Impeachment”
Impeachments began in Parliament, in the House of Commons.65
The written statement of impeachment was the Commons’ own ver-
sion of a bill of indictment.66  The House of Lords then had the sole
power to try the defendant on the issues charged in the Commons’
impeachment.67
b. Impeachment as a Criminal Matter: Parliament’s Broad Powers
The British understood an impeachment trial as a type of criminal
trial.  It ended with a conviction or acquittal.68  As Blackstone noted,
when the House of Commons prosecuted an impeachment before the
House of Lords, the Lords was trying impeachments as a court of
criminal jurisdiction, and not as a legislative body.69  By the Founders’
time, common law courts and Parliament had concurrent jurisdiction
to consider crimes (even high crimes) and misdemeanors at all
levels.70  Parliament’s jurisdiction was superior to other courts consid-
ering the same question and when it acted, other courts were stayed.71
While a commoner could be tried in a common law court. any “peer”
or noble person had an absolute right to “remove” criminal cases in-
volving treason and other crimes from common law courts to the
65. 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 31, at *260.
66. See, e.g., 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 31, at *260.
67. See 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 31, at *260. R
68. See discussion of conviction in Fitzharris case infra Section I.C.
69. 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 31, at *259.
70. See discussion of King’s request to Parliament to allow him to try high treason case
against Fitzharris infra, beginning at Section I.C.1.b. Cf. 84 Eng. Rep. 1056 (Cf. King v. Eliot, 79
Eng. Rep. 759 (1630) (holding that King’s Bench could try a member of Parliament for assault-
ing the speaker of the House of Commons and forcibly detaining him in his chair, for seditious
statements against the King, and rejecting defendants’ argument that the alleged behavior could
only be punished by Parliament). The reporter summarized the holding as “The Court of the
King’s Bench may try and punish crimes and misdemeanors committed by members in the
House of Commons.”
71. 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 31, at *259 (the House offers “a presentment to the most
high and supreme court of criminal jurisdiction by the most solemn grand inquest of the whole
kingdom”); id. (calling the “high court of parliament . . . the  supreme court in the kingdom”)
(emphasis in original); SIR EDWARD COKE, THE FOURTH PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS
OF ENGLAND CONCERNING THE JURISDICTION OF COURTS 1 (1644) http://lawlibrary.wm.edu/
wythepedia/library/CokeFourthPartOfTheInstitutesOfTheLawsOfEngland1644.pdf (“4TH INSTI-
TUTE”) (last visited Feb. 10, 2019); cf. GUY MEIGE, NEW STATE OF ENGLAND UNDER OUR
PRESENT SOVEREIGN QUEEN ANNE, pt. 3, 23 (4th ed. 1702) (calling Parliament in this capacity
“the Grand Inquest of the Realm”).  On the matter of Parliamentary action staying other judi-
cial action, see discussion of the Fitzharris case in Section II.C.
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Court of the Lord High Steward or Parliament to be tried there by
“peers.”72
Parliament’s impeachment power was broad.  While Parliament
tended to reserve impeachments for crimes involving  official con-
cerns,73 legally, a target did not have to hold an official position to be
impeached, nor did the crime have to be one of a uniquely official or
high nature.74  Parliament could exercise jurisdiction over a case even
when a common law court was incapable, due to political pressure,
malfeasance or negligence.75  It could impeach after one had re-
signed76 or even after an accused had died.77  Spiritual Lords (i.e.,
those members of Parliament representing the official Church), did
not usually vote in capital cases, on the religious belief that they had
no power to determine life or death.78  At the trial, members of the
House of Commons were selected as “managers” to press the case
before the House of Lords.79  The King could attend parliamentary
proceedings his royal capacity.80  The Lord High Steward presided
over impeachment proceedings.81  So long as at least twelve members
72. TAYLOR, supra note 47, at 439–41 (discussing rights of “peers” a/k/a  nobles to be tried
by those of their own status); id. at 439 (original meaning of Magna Charta references to trial by
peers was to nobility’s right to be tried by nobility); cf. THOMAS ERSKINE MAY, A TREATISE
UPON THE LAW, PRIVILEGE, AND USAGE OF PARLIAMENT 380-81 (1844) (“at common law, the
only crimes for which a peer is to be tried by his peers, are treason, felony, misprison of treason,
and misprison of felony . . . ” but noting later statutory changes).  Erskine May was an assistant
librarian in the House of Commons when he wrote this volume.  While he served in a period
after the Constitution, his work reflects Parliament’s history as well.
73. ERSKINE MAY, supra, 375; 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 31, at *259.
74. ERSKINE MAY, supra note 72, at 375 (noting that by practice impeachments are reserved
for extraordinary crimes and extraordinary offenders[,] but “by the law of Parliament, all per-
sons, whether peer or commoner, may be impeached for any crimes whatever”); see also e.g.,
discussion of Fitzharris prosecution infra at p. 14 (discussing a general impeachment with the
intent to produce specific articles of impeachment later).
75. ERSKINE MAY, supra note 72, at 375.
76. Thus, the impeachment of Warren Hastings continued despite his resignation. PETER
CHARLES HOFFER & N.E.H. HULL, IMPEACHMENT IN AMERICA, 1635–1805, at 113–14 (1984).
77. The Duke of Gloucester was impeached after death. E.g., WILLIAM COBBETT, THE PAR-
LIAMENTARY HISTORY OF ENGLAND FROM THE EARLIEST PERIOD TO THE YEAR 1803, 156, 223,
225 (1806) (Hurst et. al pubs. 1808)  (hereinafter 1 “COBBETT, PARL. HIST.”). Parliament issued
a writ that he be brought over from prison to face charges, but received a  response from the
marshal, on September 24 that the Duke had died in prison. Id. at 228–29. Thereafter, Parlia-
ment declared him guilty anyway, stating that his treason was widely known to everyone. Id. at
229–30.
78. MEIGE, supra note 71, at 23.
79. Id. Cf. Don Van Natta, Jr. The President’s Trial: The Standards; House Prosecutors
Compare Clinton to Judges Who Lied and Were Ousted, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 17, 1999 (actions of
house managers in Clinton impeachment trial).
80. MEIGE , supra note 71, at 23 (noting King sits “in his Royalle politik capacity” Parlia-
ment) (emphasis in original).
81. Id. at 24.
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were present a majority vote of the House of Lords could convict or
acquit.82  The House of Lords then had to request that the Commons
issue judgment.83  The activities of Parliament were considered mat-
ters of public record and were written down.84
c. Conviction/Sentencing/Acquittal
Apart from removing a person from office, Parliament had broad
authority to issue sentences, from fines85 to executions.86  In the post-
mortem impeachment of the Duke of Gloucester, the judgment de-
clared that all his lands and tenants would be forfeited to the King.  It
further declared that none of his heirs or issue of his body should have
a right to bear royal arms or to inherit the crown.87  Some believed
that the King could never be removed because he was either ap-
pointed by God and served by divine right or that he served by abso-
lute right due to heredity88  In fact, Parliament did issue articles of
deposition against Richard II in 1399, but there was no trial and they
simply removed him.89  He was later murdered in jail.90  The King set
the time for the start of Parliament.91  He also had the power to dis-
solve a Parliament if he did not like the way it was proceeding.92  A
dissolution required a new election.93  But even if the King dissolved a
82. 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 31, at *256.
83. ERSKINE MAY, supra note 72, at 379.
84. See infra note 106, (references to Journal of the House of Lords; Journal of the House of
Commons).
85. 1 COBBETT, PARL. HIST., supra note 77, at 1510 (Parliament fining the Earl of Middle-
sex 50,000£).
86. Id. at 213 (Simon Burley, after impeached and convicted, was sentenced to be drawn
and hanged, his head cut off, all his lands, tenets and chattels forfeited to the King, but because
he was a Knight of the Order of the Garter, the King remitted his drawing and hanging and
ordered only that he be beheaded the same day).
87. 1 COBBETT, PARL. HIST., supra note 77, at 229.
88. See 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 311, at *208–09, (discussing hereditary titles in England R
and the belief that “there was something divine in this right, and that the finger of providence
was visible in its preservation” but arguing that Parliament accepted hereditary title not as di-
vine, but as “inherent birthright, and lawful and undoubted succession.”).
89. See 1 COBBETT, PARL. HIST., supra note 77, at 254–67 (articles of impeachment); id. at
265–67 (sentence of deposition). Parliament replaced him  immediately with Henry IV. Id. at
267.
90. 2 DAVID HUME, THE HISTORY OF ENGLAND, FROM THE INVASION OF JULIUS CAESAR
TO THE REVOLUTION IN 1688, 241, 274 (new ed.1762) (hereinafter “X Hume”).
91. MEIGE, supra note 71, at 21.
92. See discussion infra Section I.C.1.d. (dissolution of Parliament among protests to King
taking Fitzharris case).
93. MEIGE, supra note 71, at 21.
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Parliament, an impeachment proceeding in a former Parliament could
continue into the next session of Parliament.94
2. Approaches in the American Colonies
As noted in section I(A)(2), theoretically, American colonies had
the power to enforce the criminal law on the local level, although that
power was sometimes thwarted by the Crown.95  But the Crown de-
nied the colonies the power to impeach or to try impeachments of
royally-appointed officials who oversaw them.
Having no representatives in Parliament, to remove a chief exec-
utive or other official, the colonists made their impeachment appeals
to royal authorities.96  In 1720, the colony of South Carolina sent the
Crown a petition for relief, complaining that royally appointed heads
of the colonies (Lords Proprietors) had violated the duties to deal
fairly with colonists and to establish churches and, through their poli-
cies, had subjected colonists to undue risk from “Indians.”97
South Carolina colonists also issued articles of impeachment of
their Chief Justice, stating, “The notorious crimes and offences which
immediately relate to him as Chief Justice will appear in a Remon-
strance and Impeachment brought against him by the Commons
house of Assembly now sent to your Majestyes judges in England.”98
South Carolina featured prominently in another dispute in 1763.
The colony sent a detailed statement to the King complaining of their
Governor and alleging that he had interfered in the election of mem-
94. Though impeachments had continued before, in the Warren Hastings case, the House of
Lords debated and decided this point. Debate in the Commons on the Abatement of an Impeach-
ment by a Dissolution of Parliament in 28 COBBETT, PARL. HIST., supra note 77, at 1018–1170;
Debate in the House of Lords on the Abatement of an Impeachment by a Dissolution of Parlia-
ment, 29 COBBETT, PARL. HIST., supra note 77, at 514–44 (1817); Protest Against the Resolution
for Proceeding in the Trial of Mr. Hastings, in id. at 544–45.
95. See discussion supra, I.B.2.
96. E.g., Address of the Council and Representatives of the Massachusetts Bay to the King.
Boston in New England. 1731, 38 CALENDAR OF STATE PAPERS, supra note 23, at 136–137 (Jun.
18, 1731), https://www.british-history.ac.uk/cal-state-papers/colonial/america-west-indies/vol38/
pp134-138 (last visited Feb. 10, 2018) (seeking removal and noting they have no right of im-
peachment in Parliament).
97. Petition of the Council and Assembly of the Settlements in South Carolina to the King
. . . , February 3, 1720, CALENDAR OF STATE PAPERS, supra note 23, at 332–43, https://
www.british-history.ac.uk/cal-state-papers/colonial/america-west-indies/vol31/pp323-352 ((last
visited Feb. 10, 2019).
98. Id.
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bers of their legislative body.  They begged the King for the ability to
determine their own leaders.99
In 1731, the Representatives of Massachusetts complained to the
King of misbehavior of royal officers.  They argued that delay “can
serve only to aggravate our distress, but noways helps to refund the
money, or gain any relief: there being no possibility of impeachment
here, as there is in such cases, in our Mother Countrey, . . . in
Parliament . . . .”100
In 1773, three years before the Declaration of Independence, the
Massachusetts legislature issued articles of impeachment against Peter
Oliver, Chief Justice of the Superior Court.  The key charge was that
Oliver acted as a puppet of the Crown and not in the colony’s inter-
est.101  The legislature asked the royal Governor and Council oversee-
ing the colony to hold an impeachment trial in Massachusetts.
However, the Governor declined, stating that any high crime or mis-
demeanor, if committed, was punishable under law but that he had no
concurrent power to lead an impeachment.102  Of course a punish-
ment in courts of law would have been unsatisfactory for it had to be
led by the King’s prosecutors before a judge appointed by the King.
Given the colonists’ yearning for the impeachment power, I con-
tend that many of them would have considered impeachment to be a
significant power.  These facts may explain, in part, the Constitutional
emphasis on impeachment (for removal) and the lack of reference to
prosecution.  For a better understanding, of how the colonists and the
Founders considered the link between impeachment prosecutions and
prosecutions in courts of law, the next section explains clashes in juris-
diction between common law courts and Parliament under the British
model.
99. A FULL STATE OF THE DISPUTE BETWIXT THE GOVERNOR AND THE COMMONS HOUSE
OF ASSEMBLY OF HIS MAJESTY’S PROVINCE OF SOUTH CAROLINA IN AMERICA (1763).
100. Address of the Council and Representatives of the Massachusetts Bay, supra note 96, at
136–37.
101. To the House of Representatives . . ., PENN. CHRON., July 5–12, 312 [Re Massachusetts
resolution protesting dependency of local Judges upon the Crown); see also MASSACHUSETTS
GAZETTE & BOSTON POST-BOY & ADVERTISER, Feb. 28, 1774, 1 (referencing that Massachusetts
House had resolved to impeach Peter Oliver, Esq., Chief Justice of the Superior Court before
the Governor for High Crimes and Misdemeanors and that Articles of Impeachment had been
prepared); In Council March 4, 1774. . ., MASSACHUSETTS GAZETTE & BOSTON POST-BOY &
ADVERTISER, Feb. 28, 1774, 2 (noting Massachusetts House of Representatives has impeached
Oliver but tabled the matter waiting for the Governor and Council would present a time to
proceed); MASSACHUSETTS SPY, OR THOMAS’S BOSTON JOURNAL,  Mar. 3, 1774, 1 (Justice Oli-
ver’s response to impeachment)).
102. BOSTON GAZETTE AND COUNTRY JOURNAL, Mar. 7, 1774, 2; Friday, May 27, America,
KENTISH GAZETTE, May 28, 1774, 1.
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C. Common Law Courts vs Parliament
1. The Fitzharris Trial
When impeachment talk arises during an ongoing criminal inves-
tigation, questions also arise as to how the two criminal proceedings
intersect.  Can a Department of Justice criminal investigation or pros-
ecution in courts of law continue, despite the impeachment?  If not,
when is the operation of proceedings tied to courts of law stayed? This
section explains that because an impeachment is an overlapping crimi-
nal proceeding by a higher court within the same sovereign, it would
have the effect of staying any other investigation or prosecution relat-
ing to the same offenses.
The focus here is the Fitzharris case (1681) which arose both in
the King’s Bench and in Parliament.  Fitzharris was impeached by the
House of Commons which desired to stop a Crown prosecution. But
the Crown then intervened to ask the House of Lords not to try Fitz-
harris, but instead, to allow a criminal trial in the common law
courts.103   The House of Lords agreed to defer, but Fitzharris sought
to use the Commons’ impeachment as a bar to a trial at common law.
The result was a confusing precedent, and yet one that underscores
both that jurisdiction was concurrent and that most people considered
Parliament to be the superior court in a criminal case. The principles
generally recognized in Fitzharris help us to understand the historical
understanding of impeachment that the Founders would have brought
to the question of the power of courts to prosecute a sitting President.
a. The House Impeaches Fitzharris
There are not many English cases discussing the conflict between
impeachment and prosecution.  However, the most significant is that
involving Edward Fitzharris.104  Fitzharris, a commoner who held no
103. See discussion infra Section I.C.1.b.
104. The story of Fitzharris’ Parliamentary impeachment and common law trial is told in
several “State Trials” collections as well as in Parliamentary journals and other books.  Accord-
ing to the Oxford Library Guides, State Trials was a series of case and proceedings reports, many
of which are verbatim or close paraphrase, published in various editions between the eighteenth
and nineteenth centuries.  The series was the main source of information about the history of
English criminal procedure and evidence and early volumes were produced by various editors
including Thomas Salmon, Sollom Emyln, and Francis Hargrave.  Bodleian Libraries, Oxford
University, Legal History: England & Common Law Tradition: State Trials, OXFORD
LIBGUIDES, https://libguides.bodleian.ox.ac.uk/law-histcom/sttr (last visited Nov. 16, 2018)
(“LibGuides”) (citing Lindsay Farmer, State Trials, THE NEW OXFORD COMPANION TO LAW
(2008)), http://www.oxfordreference.com/view/10.1093/acref/9780199290543.001.0001/acref-
9780199290543-e-2095 (last visited Nov. 16, 2018). According to LibGuides, in 1808 William
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official position, was both indicted and impeached for allegedly con-
spiring against the King with France to make the Catholic religion in
England supreme over Protestantism.105  Apparently in a rush, the
Commons impeached him by a general statement of impeachment,
with the intent to provide more specific articles later.106
b. The King “Requests” to Try Fitzharris in Common Law Courts
Before the trial began in the House of Lords, the Attorney Gen-
eral, for the Crown, appeared before them to state that he had an
order from the King, dated two weeks earlier.  He asked the House of
Lords to stay their proceedings so that the Crown could indict Fitzhar-
ris for treason and try him in the common law courts.107  The Attorney
General announced that he had already prepared a draft indictment
to present to a grand jury.108
Cobbett employed William Howell as editor to produce a new set of State Trials.  Howell subse-
quently produced other volumes assisted by his son. Id. (citing Gordon Goodwin, Howell,
Thomas Bayly (1767–1815)); Rev. Jonathan Harris, Oxford Dictionary of National Biography,
(2004), http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/13980, (last visited Nov. 16, 2018).
For reports of the Parliamentary proceedings in the Fitzharris matter, see 13 JOURNAL OF
THE HOUSE OF LORDS 755 (1675-1681) (digitized at BRITISH HISTORY ONLINE, https://
www.british-history.ac.uk/lords-jrnl/vol13/pp754-756) and 9 JOURNAL OF THE HOUSE OF COM-
MONS 710-11 (digitized at BRITISH HISTORY ONLINE, https://www.british-history.ac.uk/commons-
jrnl/vol9/pp710-712#h3-0010) (last visited Feb. 10, 2019).
Other sources also report on the trial or on both the trial and impeachment proceedings.
See, e.g., 3 A COMPLETE COLLECTION OF STATE TRIALS AND PROCEEDINGS FOR HIGH TREASON
AND OTHER CRIMES AND MISDEMEANORS IN GREAT BRITAIN (Francis Hargrave ed. 1797); id. at
252–95 (impeachment proceedings); id. at 295-331 (common law trial); 8 A COMPLETE COLLEC-
TION OF STATE TRIALS AND PROCEEDINGS FOR HIGH TREASON AND OTHER CRIMES AND MIS-
DEMEANORS FROM THE EARLIEST PERIOD TO THE YEAR 1783 (W. Cobbett & T.B. Howell eds.
1816) (“8 HOWELL, STATE TRIALS”).
See also DEBATES OF THE HOUSE OF COMMONS: FROM THE YEAR 1667 TO THE YEAR 1694,
1680-85 (Anchitell Grey, ed. 1769); IV COBBETT, PARL. HIST., supra note 77, at 1313–17,
1331–41 (Parliament’s impeachment, debate and rejection of impeachment).
At least one anonymous pamphlet was also produced on the trial. See the TRYAL AND CON-
DEMNATION OF EDW. FITZHARRIS, ESQ. FOR HIGH TREASON (1681).
105. 9 JOURNAL OF THE HOUSE OF COMMONS, supra note 104, at 710; see also 8 HOWELL,
STATE TRIALS, supra note 104, at 224, 227.
106. Id. The message sent to the Lords, as recorded in the Journal of the House of Lords was:
The Commons of England, assembled in Parliament, having received information of
divers traitorous practices and designs of Edward Fitzharris, have commanded me to
impeach the said Edward Fitzharris of high treason: and I do here, in their names, and
in the names of all the Commons of England, impeach Edward Fitzharris of high
treason.
They have further commanded me to acquaint your Lordships, that they will,
within convenient time, exhibit to your Lordships, the articles of charge against him.
13 JOURNAL OF THE HOUSE OF LORDS, supra note 104, at 755.
107. Id.
108. Id.
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c. The Lords Decide Not to Try Fitzharris
During the House of Lords debate on the issue, the question was
recorded this way: “The question was put ‘Whether Edward Fitzharris
shall be proceeded with according to the Course of the Common Law,
and not by way of Impeachment in Parliament, at this Time.’”109  The
House of Lords voted in the affirmative (i.e., to stay its proceedings)
and Fitzharris was sent to be tried at common law.110
On Monday, the 28th of March 1681, several Lords protested the
House of Lords’ refusal to try Fitzharris.111 They argued that the
House of Lords had no power to ignore an impeachment by the
House of Commons.112  They argued that the type of offense with
which Fitzharris was charged (treason) was one that influenced the
government: “Offenses that influence the Government are most effec-
tually determined in Parliament.”113  And they argued that the pub-
lic’s interest in such proceedings would not be as well protected in a
case prosecuted at law.114  The Journal of the House of Lords reports
the argument as below:
Because that in all Ages it hath been an undoubted Right of the
Commons to impeach before the Lords “any Subject, for Treasons
or any Crime whatsoever; “and the Reason is, because great Of-
fences that influence the Government are most effectually deter-
mined in Parliament.
We cannot reject the impeachment of the Commons, because that
Suit or Complaint can be determined no where else: For if the Party
impeached should be indicted in the King’s Bench, or in any other
Court, for the fame Offence, yet it is not the same Suit; for an Im-
peachment is at the Suit of the People, and they have an Interest in
it. But an Indictment is the Suit of the King: For one and the same
Offence may entitle several Persons to several Suits; as, if a Murder
be committed, the King may indict at His Suit, or the Heir or the
Wife of the Party murdered may bring an Appeal; and the King
cannot release that Appeal, nor His Indictment prevent the Pro-
109. Id.
110. Id. Apparently, the Spiritual Lords participated in the vote to reject the impeachment,
although they normally did not vote in capital cases. See, 8 HOWELL, STATE TRIALS, supra note
104, at 233 .
111. Id. See also 8 HOWELL, STATE TRIALS, supra note 104 at 231–32.
112. 13 JOURNAL OF THE HOUSE OF LORDS, supra note 104, at 755. See also 8 HOWELL,
STATE TRIALS, supra note 104, at 231.
113. Id.
114. Id.
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ceedings in the Appeal, because the Appeal is the Suit of the Party,
and he hath an Interest in it.
It is an absolute Denial of Justice, in regard it cannot be tried no
where else. The house of peers, as to Impeachments, proceed by
virtue of their Judicial Power, and not by their legislative; and as to
that, act as a court of record; and can deny suitors (especially the
commons of England that bring legal complaints before them), no
more than the judges of Westminster can deny any suit regularly
commenced before them.115
In short, this view argued that the House of Lords had to try the case
once the impeachment was issued.  Significantly, this argument also
conceded that, at least until Parliament intervened to assert its author-
ity, concurrent jurisdiction existed between the common law courts
and Parliament.
d. The Commons’ Protest/The King Dissolves Parliament
The House of Commons also protested the Lords’ refusal and the
King’s action and insisted that it had superior jurisdiction.  It resolved
on March 26, 1681, that “it is the undoubted Right . . . to impeach . . .
any Peer or Commoner for Treason, or any other Crime or Misde-
meanour” and called the Lord’s refusal to proceed to trial upon their
impeachment a “Denial of Justice, and a Violation of the Constitution
of Parliaments.”116 It further resolved “for any inferior court to pro-
ceed against Edward Fitzharris, or any other person lying under an
Impeachment in Parliament for the same Crimes for which he or they
stand impeached, is a high Breach of the Privilege of Parliament.”117
115. Id. (accents appearing in the original have been removed from this quotation).
116. 9 JOURNAL OF THE HOUSE OF COMMONS, supra note 104, at 711 at British History On-
line, https://www.british-history.ac.uk/commons-jrnl/vol9/pp710-712#h3-0010) (last visited Feb.
12, 2019).
117. Id. The U.S. Supreme Court has never directly addressed the question of whether the
Senate could avoid an impeachment by refusing to try the case put forth by the House. But in
dicta, in an unrelated 2004 gerrymandering case, a plurality did suggest that it could not. In Vieth
v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267 (2004) plaintiffs challenged state gerrymandering as a violation of the
principle of one person, one vote. The plurality held that political gerrymandering challenges
therein raised nonjusticiable political questions because the Court could not discern manageable
standards for determining when constitutional offenses had occurred and what the lines should
be. Justice Stevens agreed that state-wide challenges were nonjusticiable, but argued, inter alia,
that district-wide challenges to severe partisan gerrymandering were justiciable because they
were incompatible with democratic principles. Regarding the democratic principles argument
the Court said, “We do not disagree with that judgment, any more than we disagree with the
judgment that it would be unconstitutional for the Senate to employ, in impeachment proceed-
ings, procedures that are incompatible  with its obligation to “try” impeachments. See Nixon, 418
U.S. at 683. [Note that the Court here cites generally, not specifically, to Nixon.] The issue we
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In short order, the King took care of this resistance.  He dissolved
the Parliament.118  He kept his plan to dissolve a secret until he
arrived.119
e. The Political Backdrop of Fitzharris
As noted, the conflict between the House of Commons and the
House of Lords and the King in Fitzharris involved politics.  Before
the impeachment, Fitzharris had already been arrested and was in jail
awaiting indictment.120  Deeming Fitzharris of value in political wars,
the Commons impeached him in order to prevent a common law pros-
ecution and a most certain execution.121  Presumably they planned to
mismanage the trial to ensure an acquittal or, because they were the
ones who had to issue judgment, they planned to declare a light sen-
tence.122 The King’s request and the refusal of the Lords to follow
through, then, was intended to thwart the Commons’ plan.123 (Perhaps
one should not be surprised then, that persons associated with the
Commons would later be involved as part of Fitzharris’ defense team
in asserting his jurisdictional claim.124)
The means by which the Lords proceeded to avoid a trial arose
out of a fourteenth century controversy involving King Edward III.
He overlooked the House of Commons and directly appealed to the
House of Lords to try several commoners who had allegedly commit-
ted crimes.125  Initially, the Lords protested this bypass of the House
have discussed is not whether severe partisan gerrymanders violate the Constitution, but
whether it is for the courts to say when a violation has occurred, and to design a remedy.”
118. 8 HOWELL, STATE TRIALS., supra note 104, at 242.
119. Id.; IV COBBETT, PARL. HIST., supra note 77, at 1339. Cobbett adds a note that he
attributes to Burnet: “very suddenly, and not very decently, he came to the house of lords, the
crown being carried between his feet in a sedan: and he put on his robes in haste, without any
previous notice, and called up the commons and dissolved the parliament . . . .” Id. at 1339n.
120. 6 HUME, supra note 90, at 332; see also generally id. at 332–34. R
121. Id. at 334. In a what may have been a plea to Parliament for aid for her and her children
after her husband’s execution, Mrs. Fitzharris also stated that the impeachment was undertaken
to block the common law courts. See 10 JOURNAL OF THE HOUSE OF COMMONS, supra note 104,
61–62 (March 22, 1688), BRITISH HISTORY ONLINE, https://www.british-history.ac.uk/commons-
jrnl/vol10 (last visited Feb. 10, 2019). Her own access to a pension, based on her father’s service,
was blocked after her husband’s execution. Id., 180-81 (June 16, 1689), at https://www.british-
history.ac.uk/commons-jrnl/vol10/pp180-182.
122. For discussion of the House of Commons’ power over judgment, see discussion supra, at
Section I.C.1.b.
123. Id. at 334; see also discussion infra note 125. R
124. See note 139 infra.
125. The dispute arose out of the case of Simon de Beresford, 4th Edw. 3. See 8 HOWELL,
STATE TRIALS, supra note 104, at 235–39n (editor’s notes); 4 COBBETT, supra note 77, 1332n;
ERSKINE MAY, supra note 72, at 375.  Edward III asked the House of Lords to put on trial six
commoners who, allegedly, plotted against Edward II.  After some resistance, the Lords did so.
360 [VOL. 62:331
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3340094 
\\jciprod01\productn\H\HOW\62-2\HOW201.txt unknown Seq: 31  7-MAY-19 9:07
Can a Sitting President Be Federally Prosecuted?
of Commons, but eventually, they did have a trial.126  Afterward, they
adopted a resolution that this was never to be done again.127  But from
that situation, there emerged confusion about whether commoners
charged with capital crimes (as opposed to misdemeanors) could be
tried in the House of Lords, who were not their peers or even im-
peached by the Commons for a capital offense.128
Of course, Fitzharris’ counsel had to argue that Parliament could
impeach commoners for treason because they needed the impeach-
ment to be good in order to thwart jurisdiction by the King’s Bench.129
However, in light of so many later commoner impeachments, the as-
sertion that Parliament cannot impeach a commoner was later soundly
rejected.130
The House of Commons protested this procedure, and Parliament adopted an resolution that
such action was barred in the future. 8 HOWELL, STATE TRIALS, supra note 104, at 231–39;
Blackstone describes the matter in this way:
When, in 4 Edw. III.  The king demanded the earls, barons, and peers, to give judgment
against Simon de Bereford [sic] who had been a notorious accomplice in the treasons of
Roger earl of Mortimer, they came before the king in parliament, and said all with one
voice, that the said Simon was not their peer; and therefore they were not bound to
judge him as a peer of the land.  And when afterwards, in the same parliament, they
were prevailed upon, in respect of the notoriety and heinousness of his crimes, to re-
ceive the charge and to give judgment against him, the following protest and proviso
was entered on the parliament roll.  “And it is assented and accorded by “our lord the
king, and all the great men, “in full parliament, that albeit the peers, “as judges of the
parliament, have taken “upon them in the presence of our lord the “king to make and
render the said judgment; yet the peers who now are, or “shall be in time to come, be
not bound or “charged to render judgment upon others “than peers; nor that the peers
of the land “have power to do this, but thereof ought “ever to be discharged and acquit-
ted: and “that the aforesaid judgment now rendered “be not drawn to example or con-
sequence “in time to come, whereby the said peers “may be charged hereafter to judge
others “than their peers, contrary to the laws of “the land, if the like case happen,
which “God forbid.” (Rot. Parl. 4 Edw. III. N 2 & 6. 2 Brad. Hist. 190. Selden. Judic. In
parl. Ch. 1.).
See 4 BLACKSTONE supra note 31, at *259, n. b (quotation marks in original; but note that some R
editions omit these quotes). See id.; The Avalon Project, Yale Law School, Lillian Goldman
Library, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/blackstone_bk4ch19.asp (last visited Feb. 12,
2019).
Relying on de Beresford’s case, Blackstone argued that the House of Commons could not
impeach a commoner for a capital crime. See 4 BLACKSTONE supra note 31, at *259 (“de Ber-
eford” case). Other treatises note disagreement. See, e.g., 2 HALE, supra note 47, at 84, n. 4
(stating the better view seems to be that the Lords had no jurisdiction but noting disagreement);
COBBETT, PARL. HIST., supra note 77, at 1332n (saying the Fitzharris impeachment was rejected
upon a “pretense” of a rule against impeachment by the Commons that was provided by Lord
Nottingham”); ERSKINE MAY, supra note 722, at 375–76, 658 (noting Blackstone reliance on de
Beresford’s case and saying he ignored later authorities).
126. See discussion supra note 125.
127. Id.
128. Id.; see also note 72 (for discussion of Magna Charta right to trial by “peers”).
129. Cf. 8 HOWELL, STATE TRIALS., supra note 104, at 234.
130. See also EDWARD FISCHEL, THE ENGLISH CONSTITUTION 499 (Richard Jenery Shee,
trans., 2d ed. 1863) (noting various Parliamentary impeachments of commoners and the edict of
the “supreme tribunal”); ERSKINE MAY, supra note  72, at 376 (Fitzharris of little value on issue
of Commons impeachment power & noting Chief Justice Scroggs, Sir Adam Blair and other
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This political context for the Fitzharris controversy matters to the
American experience for two reasons.  First, it indicates that, however
speciously, the Lords ultimately refused the impeachment on the
ground that they lacked jurisdiction.  Thus, Fitzharris cannot support a
view that the Senate, which is charged with trying impeachments in
the U.S., could refuse to try a case for purely political reasons.131  Sec-
ond, the legal effects of allowing impeachment of commoners by the
House of Commons in capital cases was that a commoner ended up
being tried by nobility, in the House of Lords, rather than by a jury of
laypersons and it was believed, an accused was deprived of certain
defenses.132  Although the Americans had no titles of nobility, that
issue may have underscored the importance of trial by jury of one’s
peers in the American experience.133
f. The Grand Jury’s Indictment and the Trial at Common Law
Fitzharris was subsequently indicted by a grand jury and brought
to trial before the common law courts.134  Due to the King’s dissolu-
tion, no Parliament was in session.
In Fitzharris’ day, one accused of treason had no absolute right to
counsel at either arrest, arraignment, or trial.  He was examined with-
out counsel while he was held a prisoner in the Tower of London.135
Fitzharris’ wife consulted lawyers on her own and brought word of
their advice, back to him, but later a written plea challenging jurisdic-
tion was rejected because no lawyer had signed the papers.136  With
commoners impeached and tried by Lords for capital crimes afterward); A. S. Turberville, The
House of Lords Under Charles II, 45 ENGLISH HISTORICAL R. 58, 68–69, & note 3 (1930); ER-
SKINE MAY, supra note 72, at 375–76 (saying that the issue was clearly resolved later). The
Scroggs case mentioned in Erskine May, supra, was one of those argued in Fitzharris as a prior
precedent. 8 HOWELL, STATE TRIALS., supra note 104, at 233. The Scroggs case appears at 8
HOWELL, STATE TRIALS, supra note 104, 163-224 (Proceedings Against Lord Chief Justice
Scroggs, Before the Privy Council; and Against the said Lord Chief Justice and Other Judges in
Parliament); id. at 195–201 (resolution & articles of impeachment).
131. It should be noted that when the “Rump Parliament,” the House of Lords also refused
to try the King on the Commons’ charges which they believed to have been coerced. Josh
Chafetz, Impeachment and Assassination, 95 MINN. L. REV. 347, 381–82 (2010).
132. 8 HOWELL, STATE TRIALS., supra note 108, at 240n (citing authority that, by impeach-
ment, a commoner is “‘deprived of his legal challenges’”).
133. U.S. CONST. amend. VII (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right
to a speedy and public trial by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall
have been committed . . . .”).
134. Id. at 243.
135. Id. at 254 (Lord Chief Justice referring to sending a clerk to examine him in the Tower).
136. Fitzharris’ Case, 86 Eng. Rep. 228 (1693) (rejecting written challenge). See also 8
HOWELL, STATE TRIALS, supra note 104, at 250 (wife telling Fitzharris to enter a plea challenging
court’s jurisdiction and giving him a written plea she obtained from a lawyer).
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her help, Fitzharris, though proceeding pro se, was able to argue that
the common law courts had no jurisdiction because he had been im-
peached by the House of Commons.137  Under this argument, jurisdic-
tion lay in Parliament as long as an impeachment was pending.  In the
meantime, the Crown’s position was represented by the Attorney
General, the Solicitor General, and several other lawyers.138
Recognizing his indigency, the court appointed four pro bono
counsel (recommended by the Fitzharris’ wife) to assist him pretrial.
These lawyers also pressed the point.139  They argued that Parliament
was a superior court.140  They argued that the indictment and the im-
peachment charge were one and the same and that, therefore, no in-
ferior court to Parliament could now exercise jurisdiction.141  Yet, they
were still limited to arguing only the pretrial jurisdictional point.142
137. 8 HOWELL, STATE TRIALS, supra note 104, at 260 (Crown counsel saying Fitzharris re-
ceived knowledge about how to plead jurisdiction in the first instance from his wife who must
have consulted a lawyer); id. at 253 (wife telling Fitzharris not to talk too much); Id. at 257 (Lord
Chief Justice identifying Fitzharris’ pro se plea as one challenging jurisdiction).
138. Id. at 332–33 (reference to Sergeant Jeffries); id. at 324 (reference to Sir. Francis
Withins); id. at 361 (reference to Maynard resting the Crown’s case).
139. Fitzharris’ requested several prominent lawyers to serve as his pro bono counsel on the
plea.  These included Sir Henry Pollexfen, Sir Francis Winnington; Sir William Williams (former
Speaker of the House of Commons);” Mr. Wallop. Id. at 252.  For background on these lawyers,
see their respective entries at The History of Parliament Online, https://
www.historyofparliamentonline.org/ (last visited Feb. 10, 2019) (maintained by the UK Institute
of Historical Research, School of Advanced Study, University of London). See, e.g., HENRY
POLLEXFEN,  https://www.historyofparliamentonline.org/volume/1660-1690/member/pollexfen-
henry-1632-91 (last visited Feb. 3, 2019).  Winnington was on the Commons’ committee that
drafted the articles of impeachment against Fitzharris and he spoke there against the Lord’s
rejection. 9 JOURNAL OF THE HOUSE OF COMMONS, supra note 104, at 710–712.
140. E.g., 8 HOWELL, STATE TRIALS, supra note 104, at 284 (argument of Williams). Fitzhar-
ris’ counsel challenged the Court’s jurisdiction arguing four  main points; (1) that Fitzharris was
impeached of High Treason; (2) that the impeachment remained in full force at that time; and
(3) that the High Treason for which Fitzharris was impeached is one and the same Treason that
was the subject of the indictment. E.g., Id. at 283 (argument of Williams). Note that the record of
Parliament’s proceedings was not yet available to Fitzharris’ attorneys, and they were relying
upon notes taken; see id. at 265I (Sir. Francis Winnington for Fitzharris referring to effort to
obtain record but House of Lords clerk out of town; Attorney General referring to his notes
taken).
In insisting on the superiority of the court of Parliament, lawyers relied on Coke’s Institutes.
See 4TH INST., supra note 71, at 1.
141. E.g., 8 HOWELL,  STATE TRIALS, supra note 104, at 233.
142. Id. at 263 (Attorney General warning Fitzharris’ counsel, “Gentlemen, remember you
have not liberty to plead anything, but to the jurisdiction of the Court); id. at id. at 263, 279
(counsel acknowledging limitation to pleading jurisdiction). The Attorney General sought to
block Fitzharris’ counsel from meeting alone with him out of fear they would “step beyond
bounds.” Id. at 252; see also id. at 260; cf. id. at 332 (Crown counsel challenging whether anyone,
including prisoner’s wife, can assist prisoner “as to matters of fact”). After his conviction and
sentencing to death, his wife was finally allowed visit him without a warden present. Id. at 393.
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They also were not given a copy of the indictment (it was read), and
were given a few days to prepare.143
The King’s prosecutors sought to have the jurisdiction plea dis-
missed both as to form and as to substance.  They conceded that Par-
liament was a higher court generally as to matters before it.144 But
they argued that the form of the pleading as flawed as well as what
they called the “fact” of it.145  They attacked whether the two actions
were the same.  And relying on strict English pleading rules then in
force, they said that the House of Commons’ impeachment was a gen-
eral one for treason, and that the prisoner’s pleadings did not set forth
with sufficient specificity the type of treason charged.146 The Attorney
General argued, that the accused’s failure to plead the treason with
specificity was fatal and that the accused had not shown that the trea-
son for which he was impeached and the treason with which he was
charged before the King’s Bench were the same.147
The Crown’s counsel also challenged the meaning of Parliament’s
superior status. They argued that, although no indictment had issued
and the common law courts were inferior, the latter had original juris-
diction of Fitzharris’ person and subject matter, and that jurisdiction
could not be ousted after it attached.148  They also argued that since
143. E.g., id. at 255–57; (attorneys and Fitzharris complaining about limited time to prepare;
argument over timing); id. at 274 (Lord Chief Justice resisting pleas for more time); id. at 279–80
(additional timing arguments; judge granting till “Saturday”); id. at 230–31 (moving to Saturday
hearing because tomorrow, Friday, was heavily booked).
In refusing to give Fitzharris or his assigned lawyers a copy of the indictment, the court
stated that such access was not granted in high treason cases.   8 HOWELL, STATE TRIALS, supra
note 104,  at 257, 258 (judge saying not allowed in treason cases); id. at 257–58; 262, 272, (lawyers
complaining they have not seen indictment); id. at 259 (Wallop arguing sources suggesting that
denying a copy was an abuse); id. at 281 (judge denying copy of indictment, but allowing copy of
plea and demurrer); see also 86 Eng. Rep. at 228 (after assigning him lawyers; refusing Fitzharris’
lawyers’ request for a copy of the indictment). The indictment was read to Fitzharris before he
had counsel and, apparently again on the day that appointed counsel argued the plea (but not
afforded to counsel before that time). Id. at 249, 231.
144. Id. at 284 (Fitzharris’ counsel stating of the King’s Counsel “[H]e does allow the parlia-
ment to be a superior court”).
145. Id.
146. Id. at 266 (Attorney General saying plea insufficient and frivolous); id. at 237 (Attorney
General arguing that House issued impeachment for general treason while indictment points to
violation of particular statute); see also id. at 241 (saying Fitzharris was impeached generally for
treason); id. at 259–60 (Sir Francis Withins arguing the same); id. at 235 & n.195 (Withins saying
no one can be generally impeached of treason; same).
147. 8 HOWELL, STATE TRIALS, supra note 104, at 273, 277.
148. Id. at 266 (noting the King’s Bench has universal and original jurisdiction over such
cases and argued that Parliament could not oust it); id. (“[T]here was never a thing of a Crime so
great, but this Court of the King’s Bench which hat a sovereign Jurisdiction, for commoners
especially, could take Cogniznance of it . . . .”); id. at 282 (stating “it is a plea to the jurisdiction
of the Court; and, with submission, there the point will be, whether a suit depending, even in a
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all courts were ultimately of the King, he could elect how to proceed,
i.e., through Parliament or through common law courts.149
Fitzharris’ lawyers responded that a general impeachment was a
good impeachment.150 They argued that, given the fact of a general
impeachment, Fitzharris’ plea  could not be more specific.151 They
brought forth precedents wherein a person had been both indicted
and later impeached to support their view that Parliament had supe-
rior authority.152
The issue of parliamentary privilege153 also arose in Fitzharris. As
part of their jurisdictional argument, Fitzharris’ lawyers argued that if
superior Court can take away the jurisdiction of an inferior Court, who had original jurisdiction
of the cause, of the person and of the fact, at the time of the fact committed”).
149. Id. at 431 (Attorney General stating that the King has the power to proceed by Im-
peachment or Indictment at his “election”). This claim arose from the view that even proceed-
ings in Parliament were proceedings on behalf of the King. See, e.g., Case of Earl of Ferrers, 168
Eng. Rep. 69, 70 (1760). Ferrers, a peer, was convicted in the House of Lords for murder. As to
judgment, Parliament was unsure as to whether Ferrers could be given the same judgment as
provided for in a statute prohibiting such murders (e.g., execution). They also wondered
whether, a new execution date could be set if the execution could not occur on the set day, and
who could set the new date. They asked the common law courts to rule on these questions. The
King’s Bench responded that a new date for execution may be set either by Parliament or by the
King’s Bench “the Parliament not then sitting.” Id. at 69. The court stated that “Every proceed-
ing in the House of Peers acting in its judicial capacity, whether upon writ of error, impeachment
or indictment removed thither by certiorari, is in judgment of law a proceeding before the King
in Parliament . . . .” Id. at 70. It said the judgment was “founded upon immemorial usage, upon
the law and custom of Parliament, and is part of the original system of our constitution.” Id.
150. E.g., id. at 297 (Mr. Winnington).
151. E.g., id. at 308–10 (Mr. Pollexfen asking how else could Fitzharris have pleaded the case
given the general impeachment).
152. Id. at 306 (Wallop arguing “that a general Impeachment without Articles is a Bar to any
Indictment for the same Matter was resolv’d . . . in the Case of the Lords in the Tower . . . .”)
Wallop argued that Fitzharris’ case was even stronger because in Fitzharris Parliament im-
peached before the indictment. Id. (noting “the first suit was in the House of Lords by the
Commons”).
The reference to the Lords of the Tower case is to the trial of five Catholic or “Popish”
Lords who were accused of treason for trying inter alia to overthrow the laws of England and to
institute the Catholic religion, a claim similar to that in Fitzharris. E.g., Proceedings Against the
Five Popish Lords, 7 COBBETT’S COMPLETE COLLECTION OF STATE TRIALS AND PROCEEDINGS
FOR HIGH TREASON OR MISDEMEANORS FROM THE EARLIEST PERIOD TO THE PRESENT TIME, at
1218–1576 (Bagshaw et al. ed. 1810); id. at 1215–16 (referencing the warrant and later Parlia-
mentary involvement). Another case referenced by Fitzharris’ counsel was the Case of Lord
Shaftesbury.  Parliament sought to impeach Shaftsbury after he had been placed in the Tower by
the Crown. See 3 JOHN CAMPBELL, LIVES OF THE LORD CHANCELLORS AND KEEPERS OF THE
GREAT SEAL OF ENGLAND FROM THE EARLIEST TIMES TILL THE REIGN OF KING GEORGE IV,
271–73, 273 (1847). They also referenced “Northumberland’s Case.” See 8 HOWELL, STATE TRI-
ALS, supra, 104, at 311 (described as Parliament insisting that confession of treason is in their
jurisdiction not that of the common law courts and cited as  5 H. IV. Fol. 426).
153. The notion refers to a host of rights Parliament and its members were deemed to pos-
sess. 4TH INSTITUTE, supra note 71, at p. 24–25 (recognizing the privilege); see generally 1 JOHN
HATSELL, PRECEDENTS OF PROCEEDINGS IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS; WITH OBSERVATIONS,
(collection of cases on Parliamentary privilege to be free from arrest). In this case, the right
seems to be jurisdiction, as the higher court, to impeach.).
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the common law courts assumed jurisdiction in the case while an im-
peachment was pending, they would invade Parliament’s privileges.154
The Crown’s counsel argued, in response, that there was no such privi-
lege because Parliament had done nothing.155  Moreover, they stated
that one can never know what Parliament would have said had it is-
sued a more specific impeachment statement, thus one cannot say the
plea addresses the impeachment.156
The participants also approached the question of jurisdiction
through the lens of whether Fitzharris would be subjected to double
jeopardy in one court if tried after conviction or acquittal in the other
court.  Fitzharris’ counsel argued that the impeachment shifted juris-
diction to Parliament and so to try Fitzharris would constitute double
jeopardy.157  The  Solicitor General, for the Crown, responded that an
acquittal in the common law courts would not bar a later impeach-
ment by the Commons and trial.158 Counsel for Fitzharris seemed to
agree that the common law court could not block an impeachment,
but said that an impeachment could block a common law court
proceeding.159
154. 8 HOWELL, STATE TRIALS., supra note 104, at 311 (Mr. Pollexfen stating, “it is a matter
of parliament, and determinable among themselves” and referencing Parliament asserting the
privilege in other cases).
155. Id. at 315.
156. E.g., id. at 324 (”Who can prove the intention of the House of Commons . . . ?”); id. at
324 (Commons has right to define impeachment and no one can restrict); Id. at 325.
157. Id. at 306 (Fitzharris counsel Wallop arguing, in an impeachment in Parliament, the
other Side will acknowledge, that after Articles exhibited, there can be no proceedings upon an
indictment for the same offense, although the defendant in the impeachment be neither convict
nor acquit. Otherwise you may bring back all the Lords in the Tower to the King’s Bench to be
tried, which Mr. Attorney, will not, I suppose attempt”); id. at 300; (Sir Francis Winnington for
the prisoner arguing it is “against natural justice” that after being tried at Parliament, he should
be tried again at common law).
The hallmark of double jeopardy was that a second trial would twice place one at risk of life
or limb.  Some courts viewed the requirement strictly See, e.g., Vaux’s Case, 76 Eng. Rep. 992
(1591) (holding that because the indictment had been insufficient, even though the defendant
had been tried in a capital case and a sentence ordered, he was never truly in jeopardy and could
be retried when the error was found).
158. Id. at 319 (Solicitor General stating, “What if he should be acquitted here, he could not
plead auter foitz acquit, so would be twice brought in jeopardy for the same offense”); id. at 313
([a]ssume it was a good impeachment and he had been acquitted, had the Prisoner then pleaded
that as a bar to this court “it would not have been a good Plea; but he had lost his advantage by
mispleading, then certainly an impeachment depending singly cannot be a good plea to
jurisdiction.”).
159. Id. at 301. He said, “Suppose this Man should be try’d here, and he acquitted; is it to be
presum’d that he can plead this Acquittal in bar to the impeachment before the Lords . . .?” and
suggesting he cannot). He continued, “My Lord, I say with Reverence to the Court, that should
you proceed, a Man shall be twice put in danger of his life for one offense, which by the Law he
cannot be, and therefore, I urge that as a Reason, why you cannot proceed here on this Indict-
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The Court repeatedly insisted that, from its view at least, the mat-
ter of concern was only the sufficiency of the pleadings, not jurisdic-
tion, parliamentary privilege, double jeopardy or other impact of the
prior impeachment.160  Fitzharris’ counsel did not agree but; ulti-
mately, the Court rejected Fitzharris’ challenge.161
For trial, Fitzharris had no counsel. The Court stated the law did
not allow him counsel because the trial involved only matters of
“fact.”162  He was left to examine and call his witnesses himself.163  His
wife continued to help him throughout, despite being repeatedly chas-
tised by the bench and Crown counsel.164  She used the law’s recogni-
tion of a wife’s special relationship with her husband to help her
spouse.165
ment.”) Later, I argue that the Founders addressed this double jeopardy difficulty by uniquely
limiting the judgment in impeachment cases. See discussion infra Section III.C.3.
160. Stating counsel had taken up too much time on such matters, the Lord Chief Justice
noted:
We have nothing to do here, whether the Commons House at this day can impeach for
treason any commoner in the House of Lords; we have nothing to do with this, what
the Lords’ jurisdiction is, nor with this point, whether an impeachment in the Lords’
House (when the Lords are possessed fully of the impeachment) does bar the bringing
of any suit, or hinder the proceeding in an inferior court: But here we have a case that
rises upon the pleadings; whether you have brought here before us a sufficient plea to
take away the jurisdiction of the court, as you have pleaded it, that will be the sole
point that is before us. And you have heard what exceptions have been made to the
form, and to the matter of your pleading.
See id. at 325; see also id. at 295  (Lord Chief Justice denying that the case involved the right of
Parliament to impeach, the Lord’s jurisdiction, parliamentary privilege and directing counsel not
to spend time on it The Court asked if counsel wished to amend the pleading. They did not. Id. at
325.
161. Id. at 325 (Lord Chief Justice stating, “For words spoken, or facts done in the Com-
mons-House, or in the Lords, we call none to question here, nor for any thing of that nature . . . .
”).
162. Id. at 329–30 (stating of counsel “we cannot allow you them anymore; for now we are
come to a matter of fact only; and we cannot by the rules of law allow you counsel”); id. at 327
(denying him counsel before he pleads guilty or not).
163. E.g., Id. at 346. When the Crown did not oppose, the Court allowed Fitzharris a solicitor
to aid in obtaining papers he needed. Id. at 329–330.
164. Id. at 333 (Solicitor General objecting that wife has brought a brief to Fitzharris); id. at
331 (King’s Counsel arguing wife should not be able to pass messages from counsel to Fitzhar-
ris); id. at 331–32 (Crown counsel complaining wife has entered courtroom with papers in her
hand and court warning papers prepared by counsel are not allowed; she claiming they are mere
notes, and judge saying he may refresh his recollection with notes); id. at 332 (Chief Justice
threatening to remove her if she not be “modest and civil”);  id. at 332 (Chief Justice warning
that “if she be troublesome, we shall remove her” and wife stating “I will not be removed”); id.
at 345 (Sergeant Jeffries, complaining “they continue to give the prisoner papers”). Fitzharris
clearly viewed his wife as indispensable. Id. at 252, 254, 329 (Fitzharris asking for his wife).
165. Id. at 332–34 (Both Fitzharris and wife arguing she has a right to help her husband at
trial); id. at 333 (Solicitor General noting a wife has a “very great privilege to protect her hus-
band” but cannot bring instructions already drawn”).
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g. The Jury’s and Grand Jury’s Questions about the Trial
When the case was submitted for verdict, the petit jurors knew
that the House of Commons had impeached Fitzharris.  They also
knew that the Commons had stated that the common law courts had
no jurisdiction.  The foreman asked the judge whether the jury should
render a verdict under those circumstances.166  The question demon-
strated that even ordinary people understood that there were jurisdic-
tional lines between Parliament and the common law courts.
In response, the Lord Chief Justice first urged the jury to consider
the facts and not to be concerned about jurisdiction.167  But he also
revealed that the grand jury, before indicting Fitzharris, had also
raised the same question.  Apparently, so too did some of the judges.
He said that, anticipating the grand jury’s concerns, all of the judges of
the King’s Bench had met to consider the question.  At that meeting,
he said, the King’s Bench, en banc, decided that it did indeed have
jurisdiction to try the case.
But I’ll tell you further, gentlemen, this doubt was moved to us by
the grand jury, before the bill was found; we had an intimation that
they would move such a doubt to us as seems to be your doubt now.
Therefore, for their Satisfaction, and the taking away any scruple
that might be in the case, all the judges of England did meet to-
gether, and seriously debate the matter and substance of all this;
and it was not our opinion of this court only, but the opinion of all
the judges of England that we had a jurisdiction to try this man.168
Yet, this statement does not tell us why the King’s Bench opined
that they had jurisdiction.  Was it because the impeachment was defi-
nitely not proceeding by a decision of the House of Lords?  Was it
because, as the Crown argued, the King had the power to choose?
Was it because the Court believed that the House of Commons had no
jurisdiction?  Or was it because they concluded that, as the Crown
argued, the common law courts’ jurisdiction was unaffected by the
subsequent assertion of jurisdiction of Parliament? One clue comes
from the Lord Chief Justice’s admonishment to lawyers that the case
(in his view) had nothing to do with the impeachment power of Parlia-
ment “when the Lords are possessed fully of the impeachment.”169
166. 8 HOWELL, STATE TRIALS, supra note 104, at 388.
167. Id. at 389.
168. Id. at 389.
169. See supra note 160.
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That statement suggests that the King’s Bench had determined that
Parliament either had no jurisdiction or had surrendered it.
A subsequent case report broadly interpreted Fitzharris’ Case as
holding that a pending impeachment is no bar to indictment for the
same crime.”170  But it also indicated in a footnote that the en banc
court had ruled that the jury “ought not to take notices of the transac-
tion of the House of Commons.”171  The reference to “take notices of
the transaction” suggests that the King’s Bench had concluded that
the actions of the Commons was void or had been voided. As dis-
cussed in the next section, other courts used Fitzharris to justify pro-
viding ancillary relief when Parliament was out of session.
Despite the Fitzharris lawyers’ efforts, the jury returned a verdict
of guilty.172  Fitzharris was sentenced to be hanged and was executed
shortly thereafter.173
2. Common Law Courts and the Power to Issue Relief Incidental
to Impeachment
Early English courts also dealt with the question of whether
courts had any power to act in an impeachment case once Parliament
had dissolved.  In the Case of Earl Ferrers, the King’s Bench noted
that it had been formerly doubted whether a Court could proceed to
set a new date for execution if the one set by Parliament could not be
170. Fitzharris’ Case, 89 Eng. Rep. 862 (“An impeachment depending [e.g., pending] cannot
be pleaded to an indictment for the same crime.”].
171. The note stated:
An impeachment for high treason was insitutted [sic] against Fitzharris by the House of
Commons. A bill of indictment was also, and at the same time, preferred against him;
but the grand jury conceiving that they could not receive the bill while the impeach-
ment was pending against the indictee, the question was referred to the twelve Judges,
who were unanimously of opinion that the grand jury ought not to take notices of the
transaction of the House of Commons, and therefore ought to hear the evidence upon
the bill.
Id. at 862, n. a. (emphasis in original). The English Reports cite to 2 Show. K.B. 163. Fitzharris’
case has also been cited as precedent in other English cases. E.g., Earl of Danby’s Case, 89 Eng.
Rep. 973 (1683-84) (King’s Bench using Fitzharris to argue for jurisdiction of common law courts
to grant bail after pardon when Parliament not in session, though requiring party to reappear
when Parliament resumes); Burdett v. Abbot, 123 Eng. Rep. 384, 386 (1812) (dismissing claim of
trespass and assault brought against Speaker of House of Commons). See also infra note 175.
172. Id. at 391 (guilty verdict).
173. Id. at 393 (sentenced to hanging); id. at 396 (execution). At his execution, Fitzharris was
encouraged to denounce his Catholic faith and confess.  He refused and went to his execution
leaving behind, with a religious counselor, a long letter acknowledging some errors but generally
denying extensive involvement in the plot and reaffirming his Catholic religious beliefs. Id. at
400–12.
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met.174  In the Earl of Danby case the King’s Bench held that though
Danby was impeached, given that he had a King’s pardon, a common
law court had jurisdiction to determine his bail if Parliament was not
in session.  (As support, it noted that “the case of Fitzharris did go
much further, and if that impeachment did not hinder this Court from
trying, sure this will not hinder from bailing.175)  To support his plea
for bail, Danby’s lawyers argued that an impeachment “is a judicial
proceeding in Parliament, and not relating to Parliament’s legislative
power.”  They continued:
[N]ow during no Parliament this is the Supreme Court in being for
the defense of the King’s prerogative; and by the dissolution of the
Parliament, all the judicial proceedings there are discontinued, and
the Inferior courts are let into their jurisdiction.  Though proceed-
ings in Inferior Courts are superceded during their session, yet upon
a dissolution they proceed here below: and so is the law and so is
the practice and this is so in cases originally beginning here.176
The court must have accepted this view, because it granted bail, but it
also required Danby to appear before Parliament at its next session.177
3. Other Use of Impeachment as a Bar
Another use of an impeachment trial to block a common law
court proceeding is found in a case involving Warren Hastings, Gover-
nor of Bengal (modern day India).  The impeachment, which was go-
174. 168 Eng. Rep. 69 (1760) (Ferrers was indicted in Parliament and convicted of murder;
As he was a peer (nobleman), Parliament asked the common law judges to rule on whether he
could receive the same sentence for murder that the criminal statute would provide had he been
tried in common law courts).
175. E.g. Rex v. Danby, 89 Eng. Rep. at 973. See also  Burdett v. Abbott, 3 Eng. Rep. 1289
(1817) (in action for trespass against Speaker of the House of Commons and others for breaking
into complainant’s home and forcibly incarcerating him, the fact that the Commons had author-
ized a warrant for complainant’s arrest for libel and was then sitting and had accused complain-
ant of breach of the privileges of Parliament  by libel was a sound defense and courts may
determine whether or not a privilege actually belongs to the House of Commons in the case. Id.
at 1300 (using Fitzharris to argue that the court may investigate whether party had a Parliamen-
tary privilege that Parliament claimed);  Stockdale v. Hansard, 112 Eng. Rep. 1112, 1143–44 (in a
Parliamentary privilege matter narrowly construing Fitzharris to say that the only point deter-
mined in Fitzharris is that an impeachment in a Parliament which was dissolved did not abate an
indictment in the common law courts).
176. 89 Eng. Rep. at 973 (Mr. Pollexfen arguing for Danby). Note that while Parliament was
out of session, Danby’s lawyers moved for a writ of habeas corpus. Id. at 974. He had been
pardoned by the King, despite impeachment. Id. at 974. The Commons protested and resolved
that the pardon was void. IV COBBETT, PARL. HIST., supra note 77, a 1129–1131. Later, in the
Act of Settlement (1701), Parliament declared that a pardon could not affect impeachment. E.g.,
BLACKSTONE, supra note 321, at *261. Under the U.S. Constitution, a pardon cannot apply to an R
impeachment. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
177. 89 Eng. Rep. at 974.
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ing on when the U.S. Constitution was being drafted, charged inter
alia that Hastings accepted money from locals and had violated Brit-
ish statutes prohibiting such acts.  While the impeachment was pro-
ceeding (but after the Constitution was drafted), one of those locals,
Nobkissen, claimed the money was a loan, not a gift, and he sued Has-
tings in the common law courts to recover it.  When Nobkissen asked
for discovery, Hastings pleaded that complying with the discovery re-
quest would incriminate him.  To support his claim, he referenced his
prosecution before Parliament under the impeachment and his possi-
ble vulnerability to prosecution before the common law courts, under
a statute.  Citing British pleading rules prohibiting inconsistent pleas,
the Lord Chancellor ruled that Hastings could not plead both vulnera-
bilities.  He said, “One part of this plea overrules the other.  If the
defendant relies upon the impeachment, the necessary consequence is,
that, the impeachment pending, there can be no prosecution under the
act.”178
D. The Legacy of English/British and Colonial History
We can glean several lessons from Fitzharris and from British his-
tory generally.  First, Parliament sitting in an impeachment proceeding
was considered a criminal court.  Second, the Court of Parliament and
the common law courts had concurrent jurisdiction over crimes and
misdemeanors, but both could not validly exercise jurisdiction at the
same time.  Third, Parliament’s jurisdiction was superior.  Fourth,
while Parliament theoretically had the power to try anyone for any-
thing, in practice, it focused its attention on the types of crimes or
misdemeanors that posed a substantial threat to government.  How-
ever, as the Fitzharris and other cases indicate, it did not limit its juris-
diction to public officials.  Fifth, special rules favored nobility over
commoners; commoners also were denied certain defenses when tried
in impeachment proceedings.  High treason trials also had special
rules.  Sixth, both common law courts and Parliament had the ability
to issue broad punishment and to place a person at risk of “life and
limb,”  and so, principles of double jeopardy applied to prevent a trial
in both venues or a repeat trial. Seventh, an investigation by Parlia-
ment into impeachment did not thwart the work of the Attorney Gen-
eral, however, if Parliament properly assumed jurisdiction by issuing
178. See discussion supra Introduction. Nobkissen v. Hastings, 30 Eng. Rep. 535 (1793). See
also P.J. Marshall, Nobkissen versus Hastings, 27 BULL. OF THE SCH. OF ORIENTAL & AFRICAN
STUDIEs 384, 85 (1964).
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an impeachment, then proceedings in the common law courts had to
give way.  This was why the King had to request that the Lords defer
and why the jury and grand jury in Fitzharris questioned the jurisdic-
tion of the King’s Bench.179  Eighth, Parliament and the Crown’s
courts sometimes jousted over jurisdiction.  Ninth, the American colo-
nists had no power to impeach their Chief Magistrates, although they
had the power, at least theoretically, to prosecute them.  Because they
had to rely on Crown prosecutors and Crown-controlled courts, their
power to prosecute royally-appointed leaders was regularly thwarted
by the Crown.  This experience likely made impeachment an impor-
tant right for the newly independent states, and ultimately the Foun-
ders, to secure.
II. PRESIDENTIAL IMPEACHMENT AND PROSECUTION
UNDER THE CONSTITUTION
In Federalist No. 65, Hamilton stated that the Founders “bor-
rowed” from the British model in fashioning their approach to im-
peachment.180  He also noted awareness of the approaches of the
states after independence and that the states had also borrowed from
the model of Great Britain.181  This section discusses how, with re-
spect to impeachment, the Founders both adopted some of the British
and independent state approaches, but also deviated from them.  And
it shows how they reflected the harsh lessons of unfairness they had
learned from the colonial experience.
Here, I propose that the Founders would have understood the
relationship between impeachment and prosecution as a jurisdictional
one between courts, i.e., the court of Congress and the federal courts,
rather than a question about the power of a particular officer or de-
partment or violation of a particular statute.  They would not have
focused on the specific powers of an Attorney General’s office that
had not yet been created.  They would have assumed the jurisdiction
of Congress and of the courts of law to be concurrent as to allegations
of significant presidential criminal activity.  They would have believed
that there would be times when courts of law would be insufficient
vehicles for delivering justice.  They assumed it to be Congress’ job to
step in both to protect the government’s interests and to ensure a fair
179. See discussion, supra Section I.C.1.
180. THE FEDERALIST NO. 65 (Hamilton).
181. Id. (“Several of the State constitutions have followed the [British]] example.”) See also
discussion infra Section II.B.
372 [VOL. 62:331
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3340094 
\\jciprod01\productn\H\HOW\62-2\HOW201.txt unknown Seq: 43  7-MAY-19 9:07
Can a Sitting President Be Federally Prosecuted?
proceeding by impeachment proceedings.  Under the scheme they
adopted, Congress triggers its exclusive jurisdiction by issuing articles
of impeachment.
The section considers the relevant convention discussions, Hamil-
ton’s comments and relevant themes in the constitutions of the states.
A. The Founders’ Discussions at the Convention
It is helpful to begin with a review of the Founders’ discussions
about impeachment at the Constitutional Convention, as reflected in
James Madison’s notes.  While there are several references to im-
peachment in his notes, the key recording is of the July 20, 1787 meet-
ing.182  The proposed language was that the President was “to be
removable on impeachment and conviction for malpractice or neglect
of duty.”183
Madison’s notes indicate that debates focused on whether there
was a need to set forth in the Constitution a means of removing a
President.
Mr. PINKNEY & Mr. Govr. MORRIS moved to strike out this part
of the Resolution. Mr. P. observed. he ought not to be impeachable
whilst in office
Mr. DAVIE. If he be not impeachable whilst in office, he will spare
no efforts or means whatever to get himself re-elected. He consid-
ered this as an essential security for the good behaviour of the
Executive.
Mr. WILSON concurred in the necessity of making the Executive
impeachable whilst in office.184
This entire discussion, and Pinkney’s comment—that the Presi-
dent ought not to be impeachable while in office—indicates an under-
standing that impeachment could occur, as in Parliament, once one
had left office.185 The comment confirms that, however they ended
up, the Founders began with a broad view of the impeachment power.
Ben Franklin supported including a means of impeachment of a
sitting President as well.  He argued that without a means for “regular
182. MADISON NOTES, July 20, 1787, at THE AVALON PROJECT (Yale University, Lillian
Goldman Library), http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/debates_720.asp (last visited Feb. 10,
2019) (hereinafter “MADISON NOTES”). The shorthand appearing in these notes are all by
Madison.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. For this power in Parliament, see discussion supra Section I.B.C.  For provision in Vir-
ginia’s Constitution, see discussion infra Section II.B.
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punishment”186 of the President, people would resort to drastic means
of retribution or removal.  To establish the point, he looked to En-
gland and the controversial trial of Charles I.187  The notes reflect:
Doctr. FRANKLIN was for retaining the clause as favorable to the
Executive.  History furnishes one example only of a first Magistrate
being formally brought to public Justice. Every body cried out agst.
this as unconstitutional.  What was the practice before this in cases
where the chief Magistrate rendered himself obnoxious?  Why re-
course was had to assassination in wch. he was not only deprived of
his life but of the opportunity of vindicating his character.  It wd. be
the best way therefore to provide in the Constitution for the regular
punishment of the Executive where his misconduct should deserve
it, and for his honorable acquittal when he should be unjustly
accused.188
Franklin’s reference to a Chief Magistrate rendering himself “ob-
noxious,” in his day, meant liable to punishment.189  He seemed to
desire a standard procedure for removing and punishing the executive
and he seemed to fear that judicial responses would not be suffi-
cient.190 As Franklin indicates, the founding generation would have
known that the impeachment process had been used as a tool of politi-
cal revenge in England.191
Franklin’s also suggests that the reason for inserting the impeach-
ment provision was to provide a process that would be in place for
punishing a chief executive.  He refers to impeachment as a means of
“regular punishment of the Executive where his misconduct should
deserve it.”192  The suggestion is that punishment might not occur
without impeachment.  The obvious reason would be that, like the
186. MADISON NOTES, supra note 182.
187. Id. Scholars believe Franklin was referencing Charles I of England, as the only Western
monarch to be criminally tried.  He was sentenced to death after Parliament convicted him of
High Treason. See, e.g., Louis J. Sirico, Jr., The Trial of Charles I: A Sesquitricentennial Reflec-
tion, 16 CONST. COMMENT 51, 52 (1999); Chafetz, supra note 131, at 352-67.  Historians say the
trial was viewed as a sham. E.g., Chafetz, supra note 131, at 385–86. Parliament deposed Richard
II by vote, apparently without a trial—but then he was murdered in jail. See discussion, supra
Section I(B)(c).
188. MADISON NOTES, supra note 182.
189. Johnson’s 1968 dictionary defines the term obnoxious would likely have been under-
stood as “liable to punishment.” SAMUEL JOHNSON, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LAN-
GUAGE (1768) (unpaginated).
190. Among its definitions, Johnson’s 1768 dictionary defined the term “regular” as “Agree-
able to Rule; consistent with the mode prescribed” or “Governed by strict regulations.” Id.
191. See discussion supra p. 58; Jack N. Rakove, Statement on the Background and the His-
tory of Impeachment, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 682, 684 (1999) (discussing use of impeachment as
a political weapon in Stuart England).
192. MADISON NOTES, supra note 182.
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King during colonial times,193 a President would have means to thwart
it.
We find the quandary the Founders faced expressed by
Governeur Morris (New York).
Mr. Govr. MORRIS. He can do no criminal act without Coadjutors
who may be punished.  In case he should be re-elected, that will be
sufficient proof of his innocence. Besides who is to impeach?  Is the
impeachment to suspend his functions.  If it is not the mischief will
go on.  If it is the impeachment will be nearly equivalent to a dis-
placement and will render the Executive dependent on those who
are to impeach.194
Morris insisted that co-conspirators could likely be punished, but
seemed to imply the President could or would not be.  Although some
suggest that he believed the President immune, there is another rea-
son: he knew the President, like the King, controlled the arms of
power. Thus, he insisted that the penalty of impeachment had to in-
clude the Chief Executive’s removal from office—which suggests that
other penalties were, in his mind, at least, on the table.  He too was
likely thinking against the backdrop of Parliament’s broad powers.
Morris’ comments also demonstrate a concern about political
prosecutions and a need for Chief Magistrate flexibility.  He was wor-
ried about instituting too vigorous a power to impeach.
Mr. Govr. MORRIS admits corruption & some few other offences
to be such as ought to be impeachable; but thought the cases ought
to be enumerated & defined.195
George Mason of Virginia insisted that the right of “impeach-
ment should be continued”196 and tied it the principal that no one was
above the law.  His emphasis on “continued” suggests that he was bor-
rowing the notion from someplace else. But it also suggests that he
thought it might be discontinued. (Could the provision the Founders
adopted have been a compromise between those two poles?) He spe-
cifically asked, “Shall any man be above Justice?”197  Again, this com-
ment echoes the notion that without impeachment, there would be no
remedy.  But again, the colonial experience suggests that he feared the
President would hold great power under the new Constitution.  He
193. See discussion supra Section I.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. It is unclear whether in referencing “continued,” Mason was referring to impeachment
as embraced in the state constitutions or to the British model of impeachment.
197. MADISON NOTES, supra note 182.
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went further to insist that if a President gained election through cor-
rupt means, it would be a double insult to then allow him to escape
justice by “repeating his guilt” while in office.198
Col. MASON. No point is of more importance than that the right of
impeachment should be continued.  Shall any man be above Justice?
Above all shall that man be above it, who can commit the most
extensive injustice?  When great crimes were committed he was for
punishing the principal as well as the Coadjutors.  There had been
much debate & difficulty as to the mode of chusing the Executive.
He approved of that which had been adopted at first, namely of
referring the appointment to the Natl. Legislature.  One objection
agst electors was the danger of their being corrupted by the Candi-
dates; & this furnished a peculiar reason in favor of impeachments
whilst in office. Shall the man who has practised corruption & by
that means procured his appointment in the first instance, be suf-
fered to escape punishment, by repeating his guilt?199
Here, again, Mason seems to be looking to a broad view of im-
peachment like that Parliament possessed.  The notion that a Chief
Magistrate should not be above justice was also emphasized by El-
bridge Gerry of Massachusetts. He seemed to compare a lack of an
impeachment power to the existence of a royal executive.
Mr. Gerry urged the necessity of impeachments.  A good magistrate
will not fear them.  A bad one ought to be kept in fear of them.  He
hoped the maxim would never be adopted here that the chief Mag-
istrate could do no wrong.200
Madison argued that impeachment of the President was impor-
tant because of the singular nature of a President’s status.  While it
was unlikely that all legislatures or other officials would join together
and be able to commit crimes, the President was one person with a
great deal of power.  But he also seemed worried about removal of a
President in noncriminal cases, such as incapacity, where there could
198. Some have made this argument with respect to President Trump, claiming that he won
the election in an unfair manner and that he continues to break the law. See David Priess, Even
With Evidence of “High Crimes,” Impeaching Trump Would Probably Fail, WASH. POST (Nov.
14, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2018/11/14/even-with-evidence-high-crimes-
impeaching-trump-would-probably-fail/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.691aa2613c90 (last visited
Feb. 10, 2019). However, at press time, the Special Counsel has discussed no evidence of Trump’s
involvement in any such scheme and not pressed charges against him.
199. MADISON NOTES, supra note 182.
200. Id.
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be no true criminal mens rea.201 He felt impeachment was also impor-
tant as a guard against “negligence or perfidy”202 of a President.
Throughout, Pinkney seemed to remain resistant to including im-
peachment. However, his comments underscored a fear share dby
others: the fear of political prosecution.
He was sure they ought not to issue from the Legislature who would
in that case hold them as a rod over the Executive and by that
means effectually destroy his independence.  His revisionary power
in particular would be rendered altogether insignificant.203
Charles Pinkney’s concern directly raised the question of jurisdic-
tion. What “court” should have the power try the case to remove a
president?
B. State Models With Respect to Prosecution and Impeachment
The constitutions of the independent states also provided models
for the Founders. We see broad variations in how they balanced
power between courts of law and legislatures.  The choices were likely
driven by the then-existing balances of power between the executive
and legislative branches, how officers were appointed, and whether
there existed a well-developed judicial branch.  This section examines
a few states to illustrate attention given to the division of power.
Pennsylvania. Under its 1776 “Plan or Frame of Government,”
Pennsylvania placed its executive power in a President and a Coun-
cil.204  Pennsylvania designated impeachment for “state criminals.”205
It allowed for impeachment of “[e]very officer of state, whether judi-
cial or executive.”  And it allowed it “for mar-administration.”206
Pennsylvania gave the right to impeach to its legislature.207  But it se-
lected a special court to decide the matter, a panel comprised of the
President of the Senate (or, in his absence including, impeachment,
the Vice President) and the Council.208
201. Id.
202. By “perfidy,” he likely meant “Treachery; want of faith; breach of faith.” JOHNSON,
supra note 189.
203. MADISON NOTES, supra note 182.
204. PA. CONST. 1776, § 3, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/pa08.asp (last visited Feb.
13, 2019). Pennsylvania’s Constitution had two sections, a “Declaration of Rights” and a “Plan
or Frame of Government.”
205. Id. § 9.
206. Id., § 22.
207. Id., § 22.
208. Id., §§ 20, 22.
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Maryland.  In its 1776 constitution, Maryland hearkened back to
the British model for impeachment, referring to its lower House, the
House of Delegates, “as the grand inquest of this State.”209  It gave
that body broad investigative and prosecutorial powers with respect to
“any crime” and “any person.”210  The House could “inquire on the
oath of witnesses, into all complaints, grievances, and may commit any
person, for any crime, to the public jail, there to remain till he be
discharged by due course of law.”211  Thus, it seems, after House im-
peachment, the accused would be tried in courts of law.
This lower House could “expel any member, for a great misde-
meanor.”212  The state seemed particularly concerned about bribery,
fraud on the public, and related financial crimes.  It delegated trials on
these issues to courts of law and required conviction “by oath of two
credible witnesses.”213  In article 53, it proscribed such financial mis-
dealings by the Governor, Chancellor, Judge, Attorney General, and a
long list of others.214  In both articles 39 and 53, Maryland provided
that conviction for financial misdealing would void the officeholder’s
position “and he shall suffer the punishment for wilful and corrupt per-
jury, or be banished this State forever, or disqualified forever from
holding any office or place of trust or profit, as the court may
adjudge.”215
Maryland’s Constitution gave its legislature the power to appoint
the governor.216  And it expressed distrust of officials serving in power
for long periods, stating “long continuance in the first executive de-
partments of power or trust, is dangerous to liberty; a rotation, there-
fore, in those departments, is one of the best securities of permanent
freedom.”217
North Carolina.  For addressing official misconduct by the Gover-
nor and other officials, North Carolina’s 1776 Constitution allowed
209. MD CONST. OF 1776, Constitution & Form of Government, art. 10, “http://ava-
lon.law.yale.edu/17th_century/ma02.asp, (last visited Feb. 10, 2019).   For references to the
“grand inquest,” in the context of grand juries and impeachments, see discussion supra notes 35,
71 and Section I.A.
210. Id. art. 10.
211. Id. art. 10.
212. Id.
213. Id.; id. art. 39.
214. Id. art. 53 (applying to any Governor, Chancellor, Judge, Register of Wills, Attorney-
General, Register of the Land Office, Register of the Chancery Court, or any Clerk of the com-
mon law courts, Treasurer, Naval Officer, Sheriff, Surveyor or Auditor of public accounts).
215. Id.
216. MD. CONST., 1776, Constitution, art. XXV.
217. Id. art. XXXI.
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either impeachment by the legislature or prosecution in courts of law.
It provided that “the Governor, and other officers, offending against
the State, by violating any part of this Constitution, mal-administra-
tion, or corruption, may be prosecuted, on the impeachment of the
General Assembly, or presentment of the Grand Jury of any court of
supreme jurisdiction in this State.”218  North Carolina provided for the
annual appointment of the governor by the legislature.219  It also im-
posed term limits.220  North Carolina’s approach for removing an of-
ficer was, therefore, relatively simple and not directly in the hands of
the people.  The legislature also appointed judges and the Attorney
General; the governor “commissioned” them.221
Virginia.  In its 1776 constitution, Virginia targeted those “offend-
ing against the state, “either by mar-administration, corruption, or
other means, by which the safety of the State may be endangered.”222
But Virginia is particularly worth mentioning because it required that
its governor be out of office before he could be impeached.223 Of
course, Virginia’s governor was elected annually by the legislature.224
Thus, its legislature could simply refuse to reappoint a governor.  The
requirement, however, suggests great concern about impeaching a
person while in office.
New York/Massachusetts.  These two states have been left near
the end of discussion for a reason.  The Founders substantially bor-
rowed from  New York’s approach to jurisdiction, (which had, also
been followed, in part, by Massachusetts).
218. 1776 N.C. CONST. ART. XXIII at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/nc07.asp (last
visited Feb. 10, 2019)  (emphasis added).  North Carolina followed the approach of having two
sections to its Constitution:  a “Declaration of Rights” and a “Constitution.”
219. Id. art. XV.
220. Id.
221. Id. art. XIII.
222. VA. CONST. 1776, Constitution, ¶37 http://edu.lva.virginia.gov/docs/VAConstitution
_trans.pdf (last visited Feb. 10, 2019).  Virginia first adopted a “Declaration of Rights” and then
two weeks later, added a section designated “Constitution.” See First Virginia Constitution, June
29, 1776,  http://edu.lva.virginia.gov/online_classroom/shaping_the_constitution/doc/
va_constitution (last visited Feb. 10, 2019). The paragraphs in the “Declaration of Rights” were
enumerated, but those in the “Constitution or Form of Government” were not. In citing this
document, the author has added paragraph indications where none are designated. The two are
collectively cited as the Virginia Constitution, with reference to the subpart and an added para-
graph number.
223. Id. ¶37 “The Governor, when he is out of office, and others, offending against the State,
either by mar-administration, corruption, or other means, by which the safety of the State may
be endangered, shall be impeachable by the House of Delegates.”
224. Id. ¶ 27.
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In Article 33 of its 1777 Constitution, New York looked to its
legislature for impeachment.  It provided that “the power of impeach-
ing all officers of the State, for mal and corrupt conduct in their re-
spective offices, be vested in the representatives of the people in
assembly.”225  It required a two-thirds vote for conviction or
acquittal.226
The 1777 Constitution of New York gave the power to impeach to
its legislature but  created  a special court for the trial of impeach-
ments made up of “the president of the senate, the senators, chancel-
lor, and judges of the supreme court, or the major part of them”
unless of course one of them were impeached.227 But New York lim-
ited the judgment that the special court could issue. Speaking of judg-
ment, this New York Constitution read:
[N]or shall it extend father than to removal from office and disquali-
fication to hold or enjoy any place of honor, trust or profit under
this state.  But the party so convicted shall be, nevertheless liable
and subject to indictment, trial, judgment and punishment according
to the laws of the land.228
New York’s limitation on its special court of impeachment indi-
cates that New York understood impeachment as primarily for the
purpose of removal from public office (and securing the state from
further harm).  Its other courts handled punishments under the law if
an impeached person were convicted.
Massachusetts’ 1780 Constitution allowed its House to issue im-
peachments “against any officer or officers of the commonwealth, for
misconduct and maladministration in their offices.”229 Massachusetts’
Senate could convict or acquit by a majority.230 The state liked New
York’s idea of limiting judgment in impeachment, but preserving pros-
ecution after conviction and adopted it.
Art. VIII. The senate shall be a court, with full authority to hear and
determine all impeachments made by the house of representatives,
against any officer or officers of the commonwealth, for misconduct
and maladministration in their offices; . . . . Their judgment, how-
ever, shall not extend further than to removal from office, and dis-
225. N.Y. CONST. art. XXXIII (1777), at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/ny01.asp
(last visited Feb. 10, 2019).
226. Id.
227. Id. XXXII.
228. Id.
229. MA. CONST. pt. 2, ch. 1, § 3 art. VIII, at http://www.nhinet.org/ccs/docs/ma-1780.htm
(last visited Feb. 13, 2019).
230. Id. pt. 2, ch. 1, § 2 art. VIII.
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qualification to hold or enjoy any place of honor, trust, or profit
under this commonwealth; but the part so convicted shall be, never-
theless, liable to indictment, trial, judgment, and punishment, ac-
cording to the laws of the land.231
New York and Massachusetts both elected their governors in
state-wide elections,232 although the governor of Massachusetts was
elected annually.233  Compared to other states, both had established
judiciary systems.
From these examples of state constitutional references, we know
several things.  First, those who participated in the Constitutional
Convention were aware not only from British history and their colo-
nial experiences, but also from the experiences of the states, that there
were several options with respect to balancing jurisdiction between
courts of law and a court of impeachment.  It seems reasonable to
think that they expected a well-established national judiciary, al-
though they would later battle about its contours.  It seems to this
author, that they were trying to decide, as a jurisdictional matter, how
to divide the responsibility of prosecution to protect the office of the
Presidency, afford fairness to the accused, and also have a process that
would assure the people that justice had been done.  The Founders
looked to New York (and to Massachusetts) for their answer.
C. The Founders’ Decisions
1. The General Scheme
As is well known, the Constitution divides the work of impeach-
ment among the Congressional houses.  It provides that the House of
Representatives (like the British House of Commons) “shall have the
sole Power of Impeachment.”234  The Founders gave the Senate (like
the British House of Lords) the sole power “to try all impeach-
ments.”235  Consistent with approach of Parliament, the House ap-
points “managers” to press its case in trial before the Senate.236  The
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court (instead of a Lord Steward) pre-
sides over the proceedings.237  Consistent with New York’s approach
231. Id.
232. N.Y. CONST. art. XVII; MA. CONST., ch. II, § 1 art. II.
233. MA. CONST. pt. 2, ch. II, § 1, art. 2.
234. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, ¶5; THE FEDERALIST NO. 65 (Hamilton) (noting parallel with
House of Commons and House of Lords).
235. Id. art. I, § 3, ¶6; THE FEDERALIST, NO. 65 (Hamilton), supra.
236. Compare discussion supra Section I.B.1.
237. Id.
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they required a two-third’s vote of the Senate (instead of a majority)
for conviction or acquittal.238
2. Why Not the Supreme Court or Special Courts?
Although some of the states had adopted special courts for im-
peachment, the Founders relied upon the Senate, following the ap-
proach of Parliament (The House of Lords) and Massachusetts).
Thankfully, Hamilton left future generations his own insights into how
the Founders dealt with dividing jurisdiction between courts of law
and Congress acting as a national grand jury and a High Court of Im-
peachment.  In his embrace of the Senate as the correct place to try
impeachments, Hamilton focused on the proceedings as a hedge
against political prosecutions.  This concern would have appealed to a
nation that felt bruised by oppression in the administration of criminal
justice.  He used language that emphasized the investigative role of
the Senate.239  Of an impeachment trial, he noted, “Is it not designed
as a method of NATIONAL INQUEST?”240  The reference to “in-
quest” hearkens back to Blackstone’s reference to impeachment as
“the most solemn grand inquest of the whole kingdom.”241  It hear-
kens back to the notion of the grand jury as the “grand inquest.”242
Hamilton also shared the concern that courts may not be able to
balance impartiality and vigor in prosecutions.  He noted of the Sen-
ate: “What other body would be likely to feel CONFIDENCE
ENOUGH IN ITS OWN SITUATION, to preserve, unawed and un-
influenced, the necessary impartiality between an INDIVIDUAL ac-
cused, and the REPRESENTATIVES OF THE PEOPLE, HIS
ACCUSERS?”243  Here Hamilton’s words stressed both the criminal
nature of the impeachment proceeding and the political risks to the
union involved in such a trial.
Hamilton also offered the view that impeachment targets official
misconduct by “public men.”  For him, mere allegations of serious
misconduct by public officials were likely to inflame the passions of a
community.  This approach would have played well with  a public that
had only recently freed itself from royal rule in a bitter war.
238. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, ¶ 6.  New York also required a supermajority.  N.Y. Const. 1777,
§ 33 (requiring “two third parts of the members present”).
239. Id.; MADISON NOTES, supra note 182.
240. Id. (capitalization in original).
241. See discussion supra Section I.B and note 71.
242. See discussion supra Section I.A.1 and note 35.
243. THE FEDERALIST NO. 65 (Hamilton) (emphasis in original).
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The subjects of its jurisdiction are those offenses which proceed
from the misconduct of public men, or, in other words, from the
abuse or violation of some public trust.  They are of a nature which
may with peculiar propriety be denominated POLITICAL, as they
relate chiefly to injuries done immediately to the society itself.  The
prosecution of them, for this reason, will seldom fail to agitate the
passions of the whole community, and to divide it into parties more
or less friendly or inimical to the accused.244
Although the Founders gave the right to hear impeachment cases
to the Senate, we know that they considered other options because the
states had embraced other options.  Hamilton suggested that the op-
tions included (1) trying impeachment cases in the regular courts, (2)
creating a separate Supreme Court for impeachments, and (3) using a
court made up of the highest Court judges from each state.245 In Fed-
eralist No. 65 Hamilton discussed at least his own view of why these
other options fell short.
Could the Supreme Court have been relied upon as answering this
description?  It is much to be doubted, whether the members of that
tribunal would at all times be endowed with so eminent a portion of
fortitude, as would be called for in the execution of so difficult a
task; and it is still more to be doubted, whether they would possess
the degree of credit and authority, which might, on certain occa-
sions, be indispensable towards reconciling the people to a decision
that should happen to clash with an accusation brought by their im-
mediate representatives.  A deficiency in the first, would be fatal to
the accused; in the last, dangerous to the public tranquillity.246
As a remedy for the “hazard” he feared, Hamilton stressed the
need for a large number of judges in impeachment cases, a need met
by placing the power in the Senate.
The hazard in both these respects, could only be avoided, if at all, by
rendering that tribunal more numerous than would consist with a
reasonable attention to economy.  The necessity of a numerous
court for the trial of impeachments, is equally dictated by the nature
of the proceeding. This can never be tied down by such strict rules,
either in the delineation of the offense by the prosecutors, or in the
construction of it by the judges, as in common cases serve to limit the
discretion of courts in favor of personal security.  There will be no
244. Id.(emphasis in original).
245. See, e.g., Brendan Fox, Justiciability of Challenges to the Senate Rules of Procedure for
Impeachment Trials, 60 GEO. W. L. REV. 1275, 1277–78 (1992); THE FEDERALIST No. 65
(Hamilton).
246. THE FEDERALIST No. 65 (Hamilton).
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jury to stand between the judges who are to pronounce the sentence
of the law, and the party who is to receive or suffer it.  The awful
discretion which a court of impeachments must necessarily have, to
doom to honor or to infamy the most confidential and the most dis-
tinguished characters of the community, forbids the commitment of
the trust to a small number of persons.247
Hamilton’s statement also tells us something about the judges of his
day. He mentions “personal security” as a factor that might affect
their judgments. In other words, in backing the Senate as the place of
trial, he believed there was safety in numbers and a greater ability of
representatives to convince the people to accept the trial’s outcome.
3. Splitting Jurisdiction/Dividing “Punishments”/ Avoiding Double
Jeopardy
But the Founders did not want the Senate, the High Court of Im-
peachment, to have all of the power.  They also wanted to split juris-
diction in the criminal trial, allowing a second trial in courts of law.
Hamilton proffered some reasons for this approach in Federalist No.
65.  He argued that the Senate, having convicted a person, if allowed
to impose a broader sentence, might well register a bias in the sen-
tence.  On the other hand, he proposed that a jury might be able to
take a fresh look at a case if the person has already been disgraced by
removal from public office.
The punishment which may be the consequence of conviction upon
impeachment, is not to terminate the chastisement of the offender.
After having been sentenced to a perpetual ostracism from the es-
teem and confidence, and honors and emoluments of his country, he
will still be liable to prosecution and punishment in the ordinary
course of law.  Would it be proper that the persons who had dis-
posed of his fame, and his most valuable rights as a citizen in one
trial, should, in another trial, for the same offense, be also the dis-
posers of his life and his fortune?  Would there not be the greatest
reason to apprehend, that error, in the first sentence, would be the
parent of error in the second sentence?  That the strong bias of one
decision would be apt to overrule the influence of any new lights
which might be brought to vary the complexion of another deci-
sion?  Those who know anything of human nature, will not hesitate
to answer these questions in the affirmative; and will be at no loss to
perceive, that by making the same persons judges in both cases,
those who might happen to be the objects of prosecution would, in a
247. Id. (emphasis added).
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great measure, be deprived of the double security intended them by
a double trial.  The loss of life and estate would often be virtually
included in a sentence which, in its terms, imported nothing more
than dismission from a present, and disqualification for a future, of-
fice.  It may be said, that the intervention of a jury, in the second
instance, would obviate the danger.248
But other defendants in criminal trials faced the difficulty of ju-
ries acting as both factfinder and the party delivering a sentence.
Others faced public humiliation. Was Hamilton concerned that politi-
cal officers would extract political revenge for personal slights?  Or
perhaps the Founders wanted the split in jurisdiction, to give the pub-
lic its red meat, but only after Congress had saved the Republic from
further damage. But a two-trial split with equal opportunities for pun-
ishment would also possibly have exposed a convicted defendant to
double jeopardy. The Founders found a solution by borrowing lan-
guage from the state of New York, (the same language that had also
been adopted by Massachusetts). They wrote:
Judgment in Cases of Impeachment shall not extend further than to
removal from Office, and disqualification to hold and enjoy any Of-
fice of honor, Trust or Profit under the United States: but the Party
convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject to Indictment,
Trial, Judgment and Punishment, according to Law.249
Not long thereafter, the Founders would also expressly state the
longstanding common law principle against double jeopardy in their
Constitution. The Fifth Amendment states: “[N]or shall any person be
subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or
limb. . . .”250
Justice Story later opined that the limitation on sentencing in im-
peachment was intended to curb the Congressional incentive to heav-
ily punish one’s political enemies.251  But he also recognized the
provision to be necessary for the avoidance of double jeopardy.252
Why didn’t Hamilton mention double jeopardy or jurisdiction as
descriptions or explanations in these writings?  Perhaps his target au-
dience would not have easily understood such references.  Perhaps
248. Id.
249. U.S. CONST. ART. 1, § 3, ¶ 7. See discussion supra Section II.B.
250. Id. amend. V (emphasis added). See also discussion of double jeopardy at pp. 41–42.
251. JOSEPH STORY, A FAMILIAR EXPOSITION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES: CONTAINING A BRIEF COMMENTARY OF EVERY CLAUSE, EXPLAINING THE TRUE NA-
TURE, REASONS, AND OBJECTS THEREOF; DESIGNED FOR THE USE OF SCHOOL LIBRARIES AND
GENERAL READERS § 116, 79 (1865).
252. Id.
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these aspects were not the most important features of the provisions
to him.  But also, here Hamilton is making a psychological argument
that anyone in his day could understand.  A person’s reputation as to
character was considered to be incredibly important in the world in
which he lived.  He notes above the risk of ostracism of one brought
down from such a high tower of official position.  He refers to acquit-
tal as an honorable acquittal.  Remember that Franklin used similar
language in speaking of how impeachment proceedings could be a
benefit to a President as well as to a nation.253 One could argue that
these same notions of reputation and honor are less prevalent in mod-
ern society.  Yet, in this context, they resonated with the Founders
who hoped future public servants to the Republic would bring that
high respect for reputation and honor to their tasks.
4. Must Impeachment Always Come First?  Hamilton’s View
On the point of whether impeachment must come before a prose-
cution of a sitting President, the Founders somewhat left us hanging.
Always ready to talk, Hamilton has offered us an idea. Hamilton sug-
gested that, at least where “high crimes and misdemeanors” are in-
volved (whatever those terms mean), removal must precede
prosecution.  In Federalist No. 65, he stated:
The punishment which may be the consequence of conviction upon
impeachment, is not to terminate the chastisement of the offender.
After having been sentenced to a perpetual ostracism from the es-
teem and confidence, and honors and emoluments of his country, he
will still be liable to prosecution and punishment in the ordinary
course of law.
And in Federalist No. 69, he added:
The President of the United States would be liable to be impeached,
tried, and, upon conviction of treason, bribery, or other high crimes
or misdemeanors, removed from office; and would afterwards be lia-
ble to prosecution and punishment in the ordinary course of law.254
There is still a wee bit of wiggle room in Hamilton’s comments. If,
for example, the term “high crimes and misdemeanors, means really
big crimes or crimes that harm the state, then there is room for a Pres-
ident to still be prosecuted in courts of law for offenses that only sub-
ject him to fines or probation and that, while obnoxious, are not so
awful that we would remove him.  But there is no wiggle room in
253. See discussion supra Section II.A.
254. THE FEDERALIST NO. 69 (Hamilton) (“The Real Character of the Executive”)
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Hamilton’s belief that removal was the sole province of Congress.
Thus, considering a prosecutorial act from the view of whether or not
it would effect a removal makes sense.
III. THE FOUNDERS ANSWER
This article began by delving into the history of impeachment in
Great Britain and in the American colonies.  It established that im-
peachment was understood as a type of criminal proceeding, although
it had political attributes.  Parliament was considered the highest court
of the land when it assumed impeachment jurisdiction.  It established
that Parliament had the power to prosecute any crime and any person,
although in the colonial period, it tended to focus its attention on trea-
son and other felonies against the national interest.
The article established that the American colonies had no im-
peachment powers.  Although they did have prosecutorial powers
these powers were weakened by the Crown’s ability to overrule local
grand jury decisions.  I argued that the theoretical existence of a
power to prosecute a President would have been presumed by the
Founders as they were writing the Constitution, but they would also
have assumed prosecution of a sitting President would be
impracticable.
The article moved on to discuss how the Americans incorporated
parts of British model of impeachment and the approaches of the in-
dependent American states.  I emphasized their concern about politi-
cal prosecutions and protecting the Presidency through removal.  And
I argued that their solution was to divide jurisdiction, a split that
placed removal power solely in Congress as the grand inquest and the
High Court of Impeachment and allowed a second trial to proceed in
courts of law if the accused were convicted and removed.
In this final section, I will purport to discern how the Founders
would have answered key questions relating to whether a President
can be prosecuted.  With the aforementioned, backdrop, I draw the
following conclusions.
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A. The Founders Would Have Believed that, at the Outset of a
Criminal Investigation, Common Law Courts and Courts of
Impeachment Have Concurrent Jurisdiction Over Matters That
Could Be the Subject of Impeachments
The Founders would tell us that before impeachment, courts of
law on the one hand, and Congress, as a grand jury (the House) and
court of impeachment (the Senate) on the other, have concurrent ju-
risdiction over criminal claims that might come within the impeach-
ment power.  The Founders would have drawn this design of
concurrent powers from the long history of concurrent jurisdiction
shared by Parliament and common law courts, as well as from confir-
mation of this approach in the various state law approaches to
impeachment.
The question of what constitutes a removal and raises a jurisdic-
tional question is beyond the reach of this article but obviously there
are degrees of concern.  This author believes that beginning a prosecu-
tion of any serious charges that pose the risk of a president being in-
carcerated certainly satisfy the standard.  The Founders are quite clear
that, when the target is the President, protecting the national interest
cannot be seen merely through the lens of a prosecutor’s eye.  There
are many other matters to consider.  At the same time, the production
of papers depending on their nature may raise fewer concerns.  Con-
cerns may even arise when a President is not directly targeted.
Federal courts are equipped to determine, in the first instance,
when enjoining behavior or applying prosecutorial pressure to con-
vince an accused to comply with a prosecutor’s request constitutes a
removal.  A long history of considering privilege claims and Supreme
Court precedent clearly establishes that Courts have the power to de-
cide claims of executive privilege.255  Presidential communications can
be viewed in camera for an additional layer of protection for both
sides although in camera review can raise concerns.
255. Nixon, 418 U.S. at 683.  I do not mean here to suggest a view on Nixon.
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B. The Founders Intended that Impeachment Be the Only Way to
Remove a Sitting President; Thus, the President is Immune
from Prosecution in Federal Courts if a Prosecution, or
Prosecutorial Action, Pose the Threat of Directly or
Constructively to Removing Him from Office
In response to our question regarding whether a sitting president
can be prosecuted, the Founders would have posed a different ques-
tion.  They would have told us to focus upon the word removal, and
they would have asked whether one potential result of the proposed
prosecution or prosecutorial conduct is to remove the president either
directly or indirectly by curtailing in whole or in part his discretion to
exercise of constitutionally-appointed duties.  They would disregard
whether this curtailment was intended by a prosecutor.  They would
not care whether a prosecutor has no intention to seek jail time.  The
Founders would focus upon the effect of the prosecution or
prosecutorial action.  They would not only be concerned that a Presi-
dent would have his power to affect the public interest curtailed, but
also they might fear that he might turn against the country to save
himself.  Prosecutorial pressure might lead a President to act in a way
that protects his personal interest, rather than the interests of the
nation.
With these thoughts in mind, they would say a prosecutor has no
power to accomplish removal: not by prosecution, not by plea bargain,
not by arrest, not by personal injunction, or not by incarceration of a
President.  A court has no jurisdiction to recognize, grant, or enforce
such actions.  The risks to the nation are too great.  The president
must be first removed from office.  Thus, it seems that the Founders
would say that any charge that puts the President in jeopardy of re-
straint or forced action to avoid further penalty is a charge that is
outside the jurisdiction of courts of common law to enforce.  I believe,
therefore, that the overwhelming number of cases that put the Presi-
dent in jeopardy of incarceration or other restraint or enjoin him to
act, a prosecutor has no ability to press beyond the investigative stage.
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C. The Attorney General Can Investigate Charges to Ascertain
the Nature and Extent of an Alleged Crime Despite the
Inability to Remove a President, But Has Limited
Ability to Force Presidential Compliance
Because concurrent jurisdiction between courts of law on the one
hand and Congress, acting as a grand jury and a court of impeachment
on the other, does exist, an inability to remove a President or to cur-
tail presidential power does not prevent a Congressionally-authorized
prosecutor from investigating allegations of criminal misconduct.  His-
torically, as demonstrated in Fitzharris, discussed in Part II(C), the
Crown’s counsel maintained a power to investigate crimes (and
Crown courts maintained jurisdiction), even as Parliament was consid-
ering impeachment.  Note that were there no concurrent jurisdiction
for courts of law, a prosecutor could not even begin an investigation.
He would have nowhere to file his papers or obtain his subpoenas.
However, when directed toward the President, a criminal investiga-
tion should be to ascertain the nature and the extent of Presidential
involvement.256
When it becomes clear to the prosecutor that removing the Presi-
dent (including curtailing his freedom to act on behalf of the nation) is
in view, that prosecutor has a duty to consider which court should
consider the issue.  The fact that Congress declines to exercise juris-
diction does not mean that courts of law can then proceed. They have
no power to remove a sitting President.
D. A Prosecutor Has a Duty to Exercise Prosecutorial Discretion
in Deciding Whether or Not to Press a Prosecution
Against a President in Courts of Law
The Founders would say that, having sworn to uphold the Consti-
tution, a prosecutor is constitutionally required to use discretion in the
consideration of prosecuting a sitting President in courts of law.  The
office of “Attorney General” was a position with which the Founders
were well familiar.  Discretion was also a notion that was known to
them.  They expected that all officers of the law should keep in mind
the welfare of the Republic.
256. See, e.g., Rotunda, supra note 11.
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E. The President Can Fire Prosecutors Without Committing
Statutory Obstruction of Justice; The Answer is
Impeachment
The Founders would tell us that a President can fire at will federal
prosecutors pursuing claims against him.  He can order the Depart-
ment of Justice not to investigate a matter.  He cannot be prosecuted
in federal courts for statutory obstruction of justice based on this con-
duct either when he acts or after an impeachment conviction.  How-
ever, he could be prosecuted for any underlying offenses that he
sought to cover up.257  And he could be prosecuted if he obstructed as
part of a conspiracy to facilitate misconduct by others.
To understand this answer, one must return to history.  The office
of the Attorney General was created by statute in 1789, two years
after the Constitution was signed.258  Some have attributed the Presi-
dent’s power to appoint the Attorney General to merely an assump-
tion that he had this power in the absence of designation in the
statute.259  But in England throughout the colonial period and even in
the independent states, such appointment and the corollary of re-
moval, was understood to be part of the inherent power of the Chief
Magistrate.  In colonial Massachusetts, the Governor appointed au-
thorities, upon advice from local councils.260  After independence
Massachusetts provided that its Governor would appoint the Attorney
General, with the advice and consent of the legislature.261  No ob-
struction of justice statute can define the exercise of a constitutional
257. Accord Dershowitz, supra notes 7 & 8;  Saikrishna Prakash, The Chief Prosecutor, 73
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 521 (2005) (As a matter of original understanding, the President has the
power to control federal prosecutors); Rotunda, supra note 11. A more complex case might arise
if the firing of the officer, or a pattern of firing, violates the rights of third parties protected by
another Constitutional provision, such as the Fourteenth Amendment, and civil rights statutes
based upon it.
258. The Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 35, 1 Stat. 73, 92–93.
259. Bruce Green & Rebecca Roiphe, Can the President Control the Department of Justice?,
70 ALA. L. REV. 1, 4 (2018).
260. The approach was followed in Massachusetts.  In 1733, a newspaper noted that a Gen-
eral Counsel for Nominating and Appointing Civil Officers had met and that the Governor then
nominated several individuals to judgeships on the Court of Common Pleas, as “Indian judges”
and as justices of the peace “To which Nominations his Majesty’s Council did Advise and Con-
sent.” Boston, May 10, BOSTON NEWSLETTER, May 3-10, 1733, at 2; Boston, NEW ENGLAND
WEEKLY JOURNAL, July 1, 1734, at 2 (same regarding Coroner, Surveyors and Justice of the
Peace with similar advise and consent. Note the similar language used in the Constitution re-
garding nominating Supreme Court justices, ambassadors, and others with advice and consent of
the Senate. U. S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
261. MA. CONST. ch. 2, § 1, art. IX (providing governor shall nominate and appoint “with the
advice and consent of the council, “[a]ll judicial officers, the attorney-general, the solicitor-gen-
eral” and others).
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power as obstruction of justice.  The answer to any misbehavior lies in
impeachment which, is, one must be reminded, also considered a crim-
inal prosecution.
The Founders knew that Presidents might misuse their powers to
thwart prosecutions.262  They had lived these experiences under a
King.  But they also knew (1) that a President needed flexibility in
order to protect the nation’s interest and (2) that Chief Magistrates
have long looked to their nation’s chief lawyers to advise them on
important legal matters.263  The risk of prosecution for crimes offering
serious punishment also might conflict with the nation’s interest.
While the prosecutor is focused on a single case with respect to the
presidency, the President may need advice on a host of others, but
may be reluctant to include the Attorney General or a larger staff in
his circle.
In the decades after the Constitution was signed and ratified,
some of the Founders expressed thoughts consistent with the view that
the President has the power to remove an Attorney General at will.
In a letter to President Monroe in 1820, James Madison, looking back
on the Constitutional promise, criticized an Act of Congress that lim-
ited the terms of certain officers, including Attorneys General, to four
years.264  Therein, he took a broad view of appointment power as in-
cluding the exclusive right to remove.
Is not the law vacating periodically the described offices an en-
croachment on the Constitutional attributes of the Executive?   The
Creation of the office is a Legislative Act.  The appointment of the
officer the joint act of the President and Senate, the tenure of the
office the judiciary excepted, is the pleasure of the P. alone so de-
cided at the commencement of the govt. so acted on since, and so
expressed in the commission.  After the appointment has been
made neither the Senate nor H. of Reps. have any power relating to
it unless in the event of an impeachment by the latter and a judicial
decision by the former or unless in the exercise of a legislative
262. See discussion of King’s use of power to thwart colonial prosecutions supra Section
I.C.1.b.
263. Mr. Wirt to Mr. Adams, AUGUSTA CHRONICLE, Dec. 15, 1824, 1 (Attorney General’s
opinion to President Adams that S.C. statute seeking to punish vessels who bring “free negroes”
into the state and migrant blacks seeking employment is constitutionally void).
264. Laws of the United States, AMERICAN DAILY ADVERTISER, May 20, 1820, 3 (applying
four-year term to district attorneys, naval officers, surveyors of the customs, navy agents, receiv-
ers of public monies lands, and others). See also _ stat. at large 582, 16th Cong. 1st Sess. Ch. 102,
§ 1-2 (Act to Limit the Term of Office of Certain Officers, Therein Named and for Other Pur-
poses, May 15 1820). Subsequent, laws purporting to restrict terms also were passed. See United
States v. Parsons, 167 U.S. 324 (1897) (citing 16 Stat. 6 (1869)).
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power by both abolishing the office itself by which the officer indi-
rectly loses his place and even in this case if the office were abol-
ished merely to get rid of the tenant and with a view by its re-
establishment to let in a new one on whom the Senate would have a
negation it would be a virtual infringement of the Constitutional
distribution of the powers of Government.  If a law can displace an
officer at every period of four years, it can do so at the end of every
year or at every session of the Senate and the tenure will then be
the pleasure of the Senate as much as of the President and not of
the President alone.265
In 1897, in Parsons v. United States, the Supreme Court addressed
how bills that purported to provide term limits for officers affected the
Presidential power to remove the officers before the limits were up.266
The case involved President Grover Cleveland’s attempt to remove a
district attorney before the statutorily-prescribed four-year term had
expired.267  The district attorney moved for a writ of mandamus to
compel the President to allow him to serve out his term and to pay
him.268  The Court rejected the request.
At issue in Parsons was the fact that earlier statutes specifically
referenced a Presidential power of removal, but later ones did not.269
The Court interpreted such statutes as only a limitation on the length
of an appointment and not a reduction of the inherent power of the
President to terminate before the assigned period was up.270
The Parsons court extensively reviewed appointment and re-
moval power as discussed in various Congressional discussions and in-
itiatives up to that time.  It concluded that Congress would have
assumed that the power to appoint included the power to remove.
Thus, regarding why the 1789 act did not mention Presidential power
to remove officers before four years, the Parsons Court stated “No
provision was made in the act for the removal of such officer” and that
“In the view held by that Congress as to the power of the President to
265. Letter from James Madison (Founding Father) to James Monroe (President), Dec. 28
1820 in 3 LETTERS AND OTHER WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON, 1816-1828 (1867).
266. 167 U.S. at 324–41.
267. Id. at 324 (prior history).
268. Id.
269. The Court noted that the Judiciary Act of 1789, which established federal district attor-
neys, had no provision for removal of the officers. Id. at 338. The 1820 act then was passed,
providing for four-year terms, but said that the officers were removable “at his pleasure.” Id. at
338 (citing 3 Stat. 582).  Then on March 2, 1867, Congress passed the first “Tenure” act. Id. at 339
(citing 14 Stat. 430 (1867)). It also passed an army appropriations act that appeared to restrict
Presidential powers to remove generals. Id.
270. 167 U.S. 324 (1897).
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remove, it was unnecessary.”271  The Court further said that the Presi-
dent had the power to remove “when in his discretion he regards it for
the public good, although the term of office may have been limited by
the words of the statute creating the office.”272
In another case, Blake v. United States the Supreme Court punted
on the question.  It narrowly construed a statute to avoid it.273
President Monroe’s own approach also provides an example.  He
appointed his own Attorney General, William Wirt, in 1817, by replac-
ing the prior Attorney General Richard Rush.274  Wirt was later reap-
pointed by President John Adams after the 1820 term limit statute was
passed.
Indeed, if the Attorney General were independent of the Presi-
dent, then he, an unelected official, could have the power to displace a
civil officer at will through prosecution. The President’s tenure and
that of other officers would then be at the will of the Attorney Gen-
eral, not at the will of the people as indicated through their votes or as
represented in Congress.
Some have argued that if the President has a “motive” to obstruct
justice then he has done so.275  But the President has a constitutional
right (not merely a statutory one) to appoint members of the execu-
271. Id. at 338.
272. Id. at 343.
273. In Blake v. United States, 103 U.S. 227, 236–37 (1881), the Court narrowly construed
term language in the Appropriations Act of 1866 to avoid the question of whether Congress can
restrict Presidential appointment power not spelled out in the Constitution.  It read the statute’s
language narrowly to require how a President might remove and replace an officer, but not
limiting his power to do so. It left open the question of whether an attempt to limit Presidential
appointment or removal power would be constitutional.  The Court said, “If the power of the
President and Senate, in this regard, could be constitutionally subjected to restrictions by statute
(as to which we express no opinion), it is sufficient for the present case to say that Congress did
not intend by that section to impose them.”  The Court held, “It is, in substance and effect,
nothing more than a declaration, that the power theretofore exercised by the President, without
the concurrence of the Senate . . . shall not exist, or be exercised, in a time of peace, except in
pursuance of this sentence of a court-martial, or in commutation thereof.  There was, as we
think, no intention to deny or restrict the power of the President, by and with the advice and
consent of the Senate, to displace them by the appointment of others in their places.”
274. E.g., The American Beacon and Commercial Diary, Nov. 19, 1827, 3 (“William Wirt, of
Virginia, has received from the President the appointment of Attorney General of the United
States.”); Mr. Monroe’s Cabinet, THE TIMES, Jan. 1, 1817, 3 (noting rumors that Monroe in-
tended to move then Attorney General Richard Rush to Secretary of State).
275. Daniel Hermer and Eric Posner, Presidential Obstruction of Justice, 106 CAL. L. REV.
1277 (2018) (claiming President’s firing of prosecutors pursuing legitimate claims against him
would violate the “take care” and other clauses and thus constitute obstruction of justice);
Berke, et al., supra note 6 (firing would constitute obstruction);  Green & Roiphe, supra note R
259 (arguing Department of Justice is “independent” of the President and immune from presi-
dential interference).
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tive branch.276  It flows, as Madison suggested, from his inherent au-
thority as the chief executive.  Attaching a “motive” requirement to a
constitutional right is an impermissible attempt to amend the Consti-
tution by statute.  If a motive requirement exists, it exists in the “Take
Care” Clause.277   But an Attorney General has no authorization to
enforce that clause.
Thomas Jefferson might also disagree with the motive theory. In
1801,  Jefferson ordered his Justice Department to stop a prosecution
of journalist William Duane under the Sedition Act.278  Duane was
the editor of the General Advertiser, or Aurora.  The Senate alleged
he had libeled them.
Jefferson’s clear intent is memorialized in a letter to Duane.279
He asked Duane for a list of any public prosecutions against him
“over which I might have a control” and promised that “in the line of
my functions” he would treat the Sedition Act as “a nullity.”  Thus, he
said, “even in the prosecution recommended by the Senate, if founded
on that law I would order a nolle prosequi.”  He added, however, that
“out of respect to that body should be obliged to refer to the attorney
of the district to consider whether there was ground of prosecution in
any court and under any law acknowledged of force.”280  Did Jeffer-
son obstruct justice?  He acted with the motive to stop a prosecution.
But he seemed to assert that his action was a legitimate exercise of his
power over prosecutors because he believed the Sedition Act to vio-
late the Constitution. Clearly many in the Senate disagreed with him.
But they did not move to impeach him.
276. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2 (referencing Presidential power . . . [to] nominate, and by and
with the Advice and Consent of the Senate . . . appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and
Consuls, Judges of the supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United States . . . .”).
277. U.S. CONST. art II, § 3 (The President “shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully
executed.).
278. CHARGES UNDER THE SEDITION ACT https://www.archives.gov/exhibits/treasures_of_
congress/Images/page_5/19b.html (last visited Feb. 3, 2019).
279. Letter from Thomas Jefferson (President) to William Duane (Lawyer/Publisher) (May
23, 1801), in Founders Online, NATIONAL ARCHIVES, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/
Jefferson/01-34-02-0130 from 34 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, 169–170 (Barbara B.
Oberg. ed  2007) (last visited Feb. 10, 2019).
280. Id.
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F. Courts Have the Power to Stay or Narrow Presidential
Prosecutions Undertaken in Courts of Law and When the
Matter Raises a Prospect of Constructive Removal, the Balance
Should Always Tip in the President’s Favor
Conceiving removal as a jurisdictional problem affects the balanc-
ing that courts do in determining whether or not a particular prosecu-
tion or prosecution strategy should be enforced against a sitting
President.  By making removal jurisdictional, the Founders would say,
they intended to tip the balance in the President’s favor.
Such a tipping may justify granting a stay.  It is axiomatic that
courts do have the power to affect ordinary prosecutorial proceedings.
Before granting a Presidential request for a stay, a court could require
the waiver of affirmative defenses such as the statute of limitations.  It
may also see a need to reach agreements or impose rules for the pres-
ervation of evidence as a prerequisite.  But again, courts may be lim-
ited in how much they can enforce without imposing an
unconstitutional requirement upon the President.
G. A Formal Impeachment Will Automatically Stay Federal
Prosecution Proceedings Addressing the Same Allegations
Even if a prosecution has begun, when the House issues a bill of
impeachment, it takes a jurisdictional act that automatically stays any
other proceedings in any other courts considering the same ques-
tions.281  It will also stay the work of a federal grand jury.  This stay
principle is consistent with British common law, which treated an im-
peachment trial and a trial under the common law as mutually exclu-
sive.282  It is consistent with the notion of the High Court of
Impeachment as a superior court on the question of Presidential re-
moval.  Indeed, without such a stay, the whole point of placing the
power of removal in Congress is lost.
CONCLUSION
 Some who urgently feel that a particular President must be re-
moved from office for what they perceive to be political or legal mis-
conduct may find the afore-mentioned conclusions personally
unsatisfactory.  Those who yearn for bright lines may be equally dis-
281. See discussion supra, note 152 (lawyer stating in Fitzharris that Parliament file the first
“suit” because it impeached).
282. See discussion supra Section I.C.
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mayed.  The Founders certainly appreciated the risk that a President
would act contrary to the country’s interest.  But they also feared that
impeachment could be misused for political purposes.  And they un-
derstood that the future of the country rested on the need for broad
consensus before reversing the results of an election.  They believed
that power to select a President rests in the people, not in the Courts
or in unelected prosecutors.  The framework they set forth in the Con-
stitution represents a system of checks and balances that ensures that
power over the Republic and its people remains in those people writ
large, and not in advocacy groups, lobbyists, powerful individuals or
powerful families.  The framework also mimics a pattern of flexibility
that is reflected throughout the Constitution.
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